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In the past few years, there has been a concern among economists and policy
makers that increased openness to international trade affects some regions in a
country more than others. Recent research has found that local labor markets
more exposed to import competition through their initial employment composition
experience worse outcomes in several dimensions such as, employment, wages, and
poverty. Although there is evidence that regions within a country exhibit variation
in the intensity with which they trade with each other and with other countries,
trade linkages have been ignored in empirical analyses of the regional effects of
trade, which focus on differences in employment composition.
In this dissertation, I investigate how local labor markets’ trade linkages shape
the response of wages to international trade shocks. In the second chapter, I lay out
a standard multi-sector general equilibrium model of trade, where domestic regions
trade with each other and with the rest of the world. Using this benchmark, I
decompose a region’s wage change resulting from a national import cost shock into
a direct effect on prices, holding other endogenous variables constant, and a series
of general equilibrium effects. I argue the direct effect provides a natural measure
of exposure to import competition within the model since it summarizes the effect
of the shock on a region’s wage as a function of initial conditions given by its trade
linkages. I call my proposed measure linkage exposure while I refer to the measures
used in previous studies as employment exposure. My theoretical analysis also shows
that the assumptions previous studies make on trade linkages are not consistent with
the standard trade model.
In the third chapter, I calibrate the model to the Brazilian economy in 1991–at
the beginning of a period of trade liberalization–to perform a series of experiments.
In each of them, I reduce the Brazilian import cost by 1 percent in a single sector and
I calculate how much of the cross-regional variation in counterfactual wage changes is
explained by exposure measures. Over this set of experiments, employment exposure
explains, for the median sector, 2 percent of the variation in counterfactual wage
changes while linkage exposure explains 44 percent.
In addition, I propose an estimation strategy that incorporates trade linkages
in the analysis of the effects of trade on observed wages. In the model, changes
in wages are completely determined by changes in market access, an endogenous
variable that summarizes the real demand faced by a region. I show that a linkage
measure of exposure is a valid instrument for changes in market access within Brazil.
By using observed wage changes in Brazil between 1991-2000, my estimates imply
that a region at the 25th percentile of the change in domestic market access induced
by trade liberalization, experiences a 0.6 log points larger wage decline (or smaller
wage increase) than a region at the 75th percentile. The estimates from a regression
of wages changes on exposure imply that a region at the 25th percentile of exposure
experiences a 3 log points larger wage decline (or smaller wage increase) than a
region at the 75th percentile. I conclude that estimates based on exposure overstate
the negative impact of trade liberalization on wages in Brazil.
In the fourth chapter, I extend the standard model to allow for two types
of workers according to their education levels: skilled and unskilled. I show that
there is substantial variation across Brazilian regions in the skill premium. I use
the exogenous variation provided by tariff changes to estimate the impact of market
access on the skill premium. I find that decreased domestic market access resulting
from trade liberalization resulted in a higher skill premium. I propose a mechanism
to explain this result: that the manufacturing sector is relatively more intensive in
unskilled labor and I show empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the past few years, there has been a concern among economists and policy makers
that increased openness to international trade affects some regions in a country more
than others. Recent research, which started with the work by Topalova (2007) on
India and was fueled by the influential work by Autor et al. (2013) on the U.S., has
found that local labor markets more exposed to import competition through their
initial employment composition experience worse outcomes in several dimensions
such as employment, wages, and poverty.1
However, there is evidence that regions within a country exhibit variation not
only in their employment composition but also in the intensity with which they trade
with each other and with other countries.2 In this context, a nationwide shock that
increases import competition leads to a direct decrease in domestic demand for a
region’s products that is larger the more intensely the region exports to domestic
1President Obama addressed globalization-induced regional disparities in his 2012 State of the
Union Address: “What’s happening in Detroit can happen in other industries. It can happen
in Cleveland and Pittsburgh and Raleigh.” The study by Autor et al. (2013) was cited in 2012
by Alan Krueger as a Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and in the 2015 Economic
Report of the President.
2The literature on the home bias documents that trade within a country is larger than in-
ternational trade (Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)). For instance, in Brazil during the 1990s
trade between states was about five times larger than international trade. Several empirical studies
find that intra-country trade flows follow a gravity structure which implies large variation in trade
intensity across regions (see Fally et al. (2010) for Brazil, Bartelme (2014) and Monte et al. (2015)
for the U.S., and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and for the U.S. and Canada).
1
regions for which the rest of world is an important supplier. This decline in de-
mand, triggers a series of general equilibrium effects, whose magnitude also depends
on how intensely regions trade with each other. Nevertheless, trade linkages have
been ignored in empirical analyses of the regional effects of trade, which focus on
differences in employment composition.
In this dissertation, I investigate how local labor markets’ trade linkages shape
the response of wages to international trade shocks. My analysis shows that within
a standard model of trade, the exposure of a region to a trade shock – understood
as a direct effect, holding other variables constant – is a function of the initial
configuration of its trade linkages rather than a function of its initial employment
composition as previous literature assumes. Based on the standard model, I propose
an estimation strategy that uses exposure as an instrument for changes in market
access, an endogenous variable that summarizes the real demand faced by a region
and that drives wage changes in the model. Applying this approach to the Brazilian
trade liberalization episode, I find that previous estimation strategies overstate the
negative impact of tariff reductions on regional wages.
In the second chapter, I lay out a standard multi-sector general equilibrium
model of trade, where domestic regions trade with each other and with the rest of
the world. Using this benchmark, I decompose a region’s wage change resulting from
a national import cost shock into a direct effect on prices and a series of general
equilibrium effects. I argue that the direct effect provides a natural measure of
exposure within the model since it summarizes the effect of the shock on a region’s
wage as a function of its initial conditions. These initial conditions are a weighted
2
average of the rest of the world’s share in the imports of each domestic region,
where the weights are given by the share of each domestic region in the exports of
the region of interest. Therefore, a region is more exposed if the domestic markets
that represent an important share of its exports, tend to have a high import share
from the rest of the world. I call my proposed measure linkage exposure while I
refer to the measures used in previous studies as employment exposure.
My theoretical analysis also assesses the assumptions used in previous studies.
Importantly, I show that the assumptions previous studies make on trade linkages
are not consistent with the standard trade model. Finally, I simulate the model to
illustrate my main arguments in a simple example with two domestic regions.
In the third chapter, I take the model to the data, I analyze counterfactual
scenarios to increases in import competition, and I propose an empirical strategy
to estimate the impact of import shocks on wages. By using several sources of
publicly available data, I calibrate the model to the Brazilian economy in 1991,
at the beginning of a period of trade liberalization. I perform two counterfactual
exercises, in which the unit of analysis is a Brazilian microregion, a collection of
municipalities that can be considered a local labor market.
In the first exercise, I perform a series of experiments to quantify how much of
the cross-regional variation in wage changes generated using the model is explained
by employment exposure, the most commonly used measure in the empirical liter-
ature, which is given by a region’s initial employment share in the affected sector.
In each experiment, I reduce the Brazilian import cost by 1 percent in a single sec-
tor, while holding constant all other parameters, and I obtain counterfactual wage
3
changes in all the microregions. I find that regions with higher employment expo-
sure do not exhibit larger wage losses in all the experiments, which goes against the
intuition behind previous approaches. In addition, I find initial employment shares
are weakly related to counterfactual wage changes. Over this set of experiments,
employment shares explain 2 percent of the variation in counterfactual wage changes
for the median sector.
Given the weak relationship between employment exposure and counterfac-
tual wage changes, I use as a measure of exposure the direct effect I obtained in
the decomposition in chapter 2. This measure incorporates information about the
trade linkages between each region and all other regions, including the rest of the
world. I find that with this definition of exposure, regions more exposed to the
shock exhibit larger wage losses in most of the experiments. Furthermore, over this
set of experiments, the linkage-based measure explains 44 percent of the variation
in counterfactual wage changes for the median sector. As a final exercise, I let em-
ployment and linkage exposure compete in a regression in which a microregion’s
counterfactual wage change is the dependent variable. I find that linkage exposure
explains 75 percent of the variation explained by both measures.
In the real world, trade shocks tend to occur in several sectors simultaneously
and with varying intensity. To analyze this case, I perform a trade liberalization
experiment and I evaluate exposure measures in that context. More precisely, I
reduce trade costs by the amount implied by the tariff changes that took place in
Brazil during the early 1990s. I find employment exposure explains between 3 and
4
7 percent of the variation in counterfactual wage changes whereas linkage exposure
explains between 11 and 26 percent of this variation.
The calibration of the model allows me to perform a welfare analysis of the
effect of shocks. I obtain that counterfactual real wages, the measure of welfare
in the model, increase by 0.11 log points on average as a consequence of trade
liberalization. However, real wages do not increase in all regions, which implies that
some regions lose from tariff reductions. I also find that linkage exposure can explain
more of the cross-regional variation in real wages than employment exposure.
Having evaluated the predictive capacity of exposure measures using model-
generated wage changes, I propose an estimation strategy that incorporates trade
linkages in the analysis of the effects of trade on observed wages. In the model,
changes in wages are completely determined by changes in market access. Market
access is an endogenous variable that summarizes the real demand faced by a region
and it is equal to a trade cost weighted average of real expenditures in all regions.
Since changes in market access are not exogenous, we expect the estimates of the
elasticity of wages with respect to market access to be biased. I argue that a measure
of linkage exposure is a valid instrument for changes in market access within Brazil.
By using this instrument and observed wage changes between 1991-2000, I estimate
a wage elasticity with respect to domestic market access of 0.12. I perform several
robustness checks that leave this main result essentially unaltered.
Finally, I compare the results of the market access approach I propose with
the results of the reduced-form approach, which utilizes employment exposure to
predict wage changes. My estimates imply that a region at the 25th percentile of
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the change in domestic market access induced by trade liberalization, experiences
a 0.6 log points larger wage decline (or smaller wage increase) than a region at the
75th percentile. The estimates from a regression of wages changes on employment
exposure imply that a region at the 25th percentile of exposure experiences a 3
log points larger wage decline (or smaller wage increase) than a region at the 75th
percentile.3 I conclude that reduced-form estimates based on employment exposure
overstate the negative impact of trade liberalization on wages in Brazil.
In the fourth chapter, I extend the standard model to allow for two types of
workers according to their education levels: skilled and unskilled. I show that there
is substantial variation across Brazilian regions in the skill premium, defined as the
log difference of wages between skilled and unskilled workers. I use the exogenous
variation provided by tariff changes to estimate the impact of market access on the
skill premium. I find that decreased domestic market access resulting from trade
liberalization resulted in a higher skill premium and that this is explained by a
higher elasticity of unskilled wages to market access compared to skilled wages. I
propose a mechanism to explain this result: that the manufacturing sector is rela-
tively more intensive in unskilled labor and I show empirical evidence that supports
this hypothesis.
My dissertation contributes to several strands of the literature. In the first
place, it relates to the aforementioned empirical studies on the effects of trade
shocks on local labor markets’ outcomes. In her work, Topalova (2007) and Topalova
3Since tariff changes are negative, a lower (more negative) exposure leads to a higher wage
decline.
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(2010) find that rural districts in India that were more exposed to trade liberaliza-
tion through their employment composition experienced a lower decline in poverty
than less exposed regions. McLaren and Hakobyan (2010) find that U.S. locations
more vulnerable to NAFTA experienced lower wage growth than locations that had
no protection against Mexico. Kovak (2013) finds that Brazilian regions that expe-
rienced a larger price decline due to a change in tariffs experienced a larger wage
decline. Autor et al. (2013) estimate the impact of the increase in Chinese import
penetration in the U.S. and find that rising imports from China cause higher un-
employment, lower labor force participation, and lower wages in commuting zones
that are relatively more specialized in import-competing manufacturing industries.
Chiquiar et al. (2015) apply this empirical framework to Mexico and find hetero-
geneity between border and non-border states, with effects of exposure on the labor
market being higher in states that share a border with the US.
Among these studies, only Kovak (2013) and Autor et al. (2013) derive their
econometric specifications from a trade model. Kovak (2013) develops a specific-
factors model that delivers that the wage change in a region is a weighted average
of goods prices changes with weights that depend on the fraction of regional labor
allocated to each sector. In this model, trade linkages do not play a role in deter-
mining price changes since goods are homogeneous and there are no transport costs.
Therefore, trade flows do not follow a gravity structure. Autor et al. (2013) use a
conventional trade model that yields a gravity equation. However, they make a set
of simplifying assumptions to arrive to an estimating equation and leave no role for
trade linkages between local labor markets. I analyze these assumptions in section
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2.4. I contribute to this literature in several ways: first, by deriving an exposure
measure that takes trade linkages into account, second, by analyzing the predictive
power of employment-based exposure measures in the context of a standard model,
and third, by reinterpreting exposure measures as instruments for domestic market
access.
In the second place, my dissertation relates to the international trade literature
that quantifies the effects of globalization. Several authors use the workhorse model
of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to calculate gains from trade and to measure the
impact of trade shocks on labor markets. For example, Caliendo and Parro (2014)
quantify the welfare and real wage effects of the NAFTA agreement and Caliendo
et al. (2014) study the transmission of productivity shocks through trade linkages
across U.S. states. Some studies allow for migration between labor markets, like
Fan (2015), Redding (2012), Monte (2014) and Monte et al. (2015), where the last
two incorporate commuting. In a recent paper, Caliendo et al. (2015) quantify the
impacts of the China shock studied by Autor et al. (2013) using a dynamic trade
model and find that this shock can explain 50 percent of the unexplained change in
manufacturing employment.
The studies in this literature that are closely related to my dissertation are
Monte (2014) and Monte et al. (2015). Both of them evaluate the performance
of reduced-form approaches compared to the predictions of a model with linkages.
Monte (2014) does so in a model with commuting but where trade costs are uniform
across all regions in the country, so there is no role for gravity forces. In addition,
he only shocks one industry while I conduct an analysis industry by industry. This
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allows me to find that in some sectors the correlation between employment exposure
and changes in wages goes in the wrong direction. In Monte et al. (2015) trade
follows a gravity structure but the focus of the study is on the employment elasticity
while the focus of my analysis is on the wage elasticity. In addition, their model is
single-sector, so industry composition plays no role. Finally, both papers evaluate
reduced form methods by using counterfactual wage changes, while I go one step
further and propose an estimation strategy that uses observed wage changes.
In the third place, my dissertation relates to the literature that studies the
influence of geography on factor prices. Harris (1954) first introduced the concept
of market potential defined ad hoc as the summation of markets accessible to a region
divided by their distances from that region.4 Fifty years later, Fujita et al. (1999)
derived from first principles the wage equation: a relationship between factor prices
and market potential. Based on their model, Redding and Venables (2004) propose
a two-step procedure to estimate the wage equation using cross-country variation in
income. Hanson (2005) also uses Fujita et al. (1999) framework to study the spatial
correlation between wages and consumer purchasing power across U.S. counties for
the period 1970-1990. In a related study, Kumar (2007) estimates the impact of
domestic and foreign market access on regional wages in India during a period
of trade liberalization. More recently, Bartelme (2014) estimates the elasticity of
wages and employment with respect to market access, an analogous notion to market
potential, using U.S. MSA level data for the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2007.
4Although the notion of market potential is usually attributed to Harris, in his 1954 paper he
attributes the concept to Colin Clark.
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I contribute to this literature by proposing an estimation strategy that uses
changes in tariffs to identify the elasticity of wages to market access. The works by
Kumar (2007) and Bartelme (2014) are the most closely related to my dissertation.
My strategy differs from Kumar (2007) in two main aspects. First, he uses an ad
hoc measure of market access, in the spirit of Harris (1954), whereas I construct
market access using the structure of the model. Second, he measures the effect of
trade liberalization by interacting initial market access with a liberalization dummy
whereas I use variation in tariff changes to construct an instrument for market
access. My strategy differs from Bartelme (2014) in that he uses an ad hoc Bartik
instrument for market access while I derive my instrument from a trade model.
The influence of geography on relative factor prices or on the skill premium
is a much less studied phenomenon. Venables and Limão (2002) develop a spatial
Heckscher-Ohlin model in which the relationship between relative factor returns and
distance is non-monotonic across different zones. Thus, depending on the pattern
of specialization, relative factor returns can increase or decrease with remoteness.
Chiquiar (2008) develops a simplified version of Venables and Limão (2002) to an-
alyze if there were Stolper-Samuelson effects in Mexican regions after trade liberal-
ization and finds that U.S. bordering and North states had an increase in unskilled
wages and a drop in the skill premium. Redding and Schott (2003) extend Fujita
et al. (1999) to allow for two types of workers and they find that educational attain-
ment has a positive correlation with market access across countries. However, they
do not estimate the impact of market access on the skill premium. My dissertation
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contributes to this literature by providing an estimate of the elasticity of the skill
premium to market access.
Finally, my dissertation relates to the studies on the impact of trade liberal-
ization on wage inequality in developing countries. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)
document an increase in inequality in several developing countries during the 1980s
and 1990s. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003), Attanasio et al. (2004), and Gonzaga
et al. (2006) use variation in the industry skill premium to estimate the impact of
increased trade openness on wage inequality. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) use
Argentine data and find that sectors in which import penetration increased, also
experienced an increase in wage inequality but that this channel explains a small
share of the observed rise in wage inequality. Attanasio et al. (2004) find that in-
dustry affiliation is an important determinant of workers’ earnings in Brazil but the
structure of industry wage premia is relatively stable over time. Gonzaga et al.
(2006) document that skilled labor earnings differentials decreased during trade lib-
eralization and they find that employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive
manufacturing sectors, that each sector increased its relative share of skilled labor,
and that relative prices fell in skill-intensive sectors. Following a different strategy,
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2014) use regional variation in employment composition
to analyze the effect of the Brazilian trade liberalization on regional wage inequal-
ity and find small effects of trade liberalization on the skill premium between 1991
and 2000. My dissertation contributes to this literature by providing a rationale
to the tendency towards an increase in the skill premium in developing countries:
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unilateral trade liberalizations reduces domestic market access and if the non-traded
sector is relatively skill intensive, then the skill premium increases.
My dissertation bridges the gap between parallel literatures on the impacts
of trade on labor markets’ outcomes by reinterpreting the reduced form approach
based on employment composition within a standard trade framework. I directly
contribute to the reduced form literature by deriving a measure of exposure from a
trade model and by showing this measure explains more of the variation in model-
generated wage changes than measures based on employment composition. Fur-
thermore, I propose an estimation strategy that uses my measure of exposure as
an instrument for changes in market access, which are the driver of wage changes
in the model. My estimates suggest that the employment-based measures used in





Trade linkages between regions in a country generate complex interactions between
endogenous variables after a nationwide shock. To understand these mechanisms,
in section 2.2 I lay out a standard multi-region and multi-sector general equilibrium
trade model and in section 2.3 I decompose regional wage changes after a sectoral
trade cost shock. In order to derive an employment exposure measure from this
decomposition, it is necessary to make a set of simplifying assumptions that I state
explicitly in section 2.4. Finally, to illustrate some of my main arguments I simulate
the model in a 2-region and 2-sector case in section 2.5.
2.2 Environment, behavior, and equilibrium
Environment The world economy consists of two main countries: the Home coun-
try, denoted by H, and the Rest of the World (ROW), denoted by R. The Home
country, is a collection of regions i = 1 . . . N that trade with each other as well as
with ROW. There are multiple sectors in each region: one non-traded sector and
several traded sectors k = 1, . . . , K that use labor as the only a factor of production.
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Labor is supplied inelastically in each region and is perfectly mobile between sectors
but immobile between regions. The non-traded good is produced using a constant
returns to scale technology. The traded goods are produced using an increasing
returns to scale technology and are subject to iceberg transport costs and, if they
cross international borders, to tariffs.1
Consumer The representative consumer from region j (from now on j denotes
the importing region and i the exporting region) has preferences given by a Cobb-







with ∑Nk=0 µk = 1, where C0j denotes consumption of the non-traded good
(indexed with 0) and Ckj (k = 1 . . . K) corresponds to a CES consumption index of
traded goods of differentiated varieties.2
Expenditure minimization by consumers in each region j yields an ideal price









1This setup is based on Autor et al. (2013). The main difference lies in the assumptions on
trade deficits and on the non-traded sector technology. See footnote 5 for more detail. In addition,
I analyze the effect of tariff shocks while their focus is on foreign productivity shocks.
2In equilibrium, all the varieties of an industry from region i are equally priced and therefore,











σk , σk > 1, k = 1, . . . , N . Where σk is the (constant) elasticity of substitution
between varieties in sector k and nki is the number of varieties of good k.
14
where σk > 1 is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between varieties in
sector k, nki is the number of varieties of good k, and pkij is the price of any variety
of good k produced in region i and consumed in region j.3
By Sheppard’s Lemma, region j’s demand for any variety of good k produced









where Ej is region’s j total expenditure, which includes expenditure on both
manufactures and non-traded goods.4 Demand for any good produced by i is: the
decreasing in its c.i.f. price (pkij), increasing in expenditure in the destination market
(Ej), and decreasing in competition in the destination market (i.e. increasing in P kj ).
Non-traded sector The non-traded good is produced with a CRS technology






where L0i is the amount of labor used in production of the non-traded good and η
is a productivity parameter that does not vary across regions.5
3The equality in equation 2.2 relies on symmetry of prices in equilibrium.










ij , where p0j is the price of the non-traded good.
5Autor et al. (2013) assume decreasing returns to scale in the production of the non-traded
good so that any shock that expands employment in this sector exerts a downward pressure on
wages in the region. However, the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas upper tier utility function implies
employment in this sector is constant. To guarantee that non-traded sector employment changes
after a shock, the authors allow for exogenous trade deficits. Since the focus of my analysis is on
wages and not on non-traded employment, I assume balanced trade. I leave the analysis of trade
imbalances and changes in non-traded employment for future research.
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Producers in this sector take their good price and the wage as given so profit
maximization implies
wi = ηp0i (2.5)
where wi is the wage in region i and p0i is the price of the non-traded good in
region i.
Traded sectors The traded goods production side of the model follows Krugman
(1980). These type of goods are produced with an increasing returns to scale tech-
nology and are traded at a cost κkij ≡ dkijbkijτ kij. The first component, dkij > 1 is the
iceberg transport cost of shipping good k from i to j. This cost is incurred when
shipping goods between regions in Home and when shipping goods between Home
and ROW , and viceversa. It is also incurred when any region trades with itself
which means, dii > 1.6 The second component, bkij > 1 is equal to 1 plus the tariff
equivalent of non-tariff border-related costs. The third component, τ kij ≡ 1 + tkij
is the tariff factor, with tkij the ad-valorem tariff region j applies to imports from
region i and sector k. Note that bkij = τ kij = 0 when both i and j belong to Home
and when ROW trades with itself.
The market structure is characterized by monopolistic competition: each firm
in sector k faces a downward sloping demand curve with perceived price elasticity
equal to σk, the elasticity of substitution in the consumption of varieties of good k.
6dkij units of the good must be shipped at the origin for one unit to arrive at the destination,
which implies that a fraction (dkij − 1)/dkij of the good is lost in transit.
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The amount of labor required in each traded sector to produce qki units of the good
is given by
lki = F k + qki /βki (2.6)
where F k is a fixed cost that does not vary across regions and βki is the pro-
ductivity specific to sector k and region i. Variation in βki reflects regional variation
in natural comparative advantage.7
Under Mill pricing, the f.o.b. price pki = pkij/dkij does not depend on the
destination market. Therefore, producers in each traded sector solve for one price:
pki . Due to CES preferences and Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility, the optimal pricing









To close the production side of the model, I assume free entry into the traded
sector. This drives firms’ profits to zero and determines the number of firms in each
traded sector. Since each firm’s perceived demand elasticity is constant and equal to
σk, the optimal scale of the firm depends only on parameters that are not affected by
shocks to prices: qki = (σk − 1)F kβki . Therefore, all of the adjustment to a sectoral
7The assumption that fixed costs do not vary across regions is for ease of interpretation and
without loss of generality. Allowing for F k to vary across regions would only change the interpre-
tation of the calibrated parameters, βki , since βki and F k enter multiplicatively in the expression
for expenditure shares (equation 2.11) but since F k is assumed not to vary across regions it is
simplified and does not appear in the expression.
17
trade shock occurs at the extensive margin through changes in the number of firms
(varieties) and not through changes in the size of firms.
Finally, free entry implies the following linear relationship between the number





Since the number of firms is generally not observed but sectoral employment
is, this expression proves useful to bring the model to the data.
Gravity In this model trade flows are governed by a gravity equation








whereXkij is region j’s expenditure on sector k goods produced in region i. This
formula can be derived by multiplying the number of varieties of good k produced
in region i, nki , by prices paid in j for those varieties, pkij, and by the demand for
those varieties in region j, ckij.
Xkij is increasing in the number of varieties produced in i in sector k, nki ,
increasing in total expenditure in region j, Ej, decreasing in competition in market
j, P kj , and decreasing in the prices at which i sells its varieties to j, pkij.
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The gravity equation is one of the most successful empirical applications of
trade theory.8 In the quantitative section of this paper I use this equation to estimate
sectoral trade costs.
Equilibrium Under balanced trade, total expenditure in region j is given by Ej =
wjLj.9 The non-traded good market clearing condition is given by p0jX0j = µ0wjLj,
which together with equations 2.4 and 2.5 implies labor in the non-traded sector is
a fixed share of total labor L0j = µ0Lj.
Labor market clearing in each region j requires that the sum of labor demand
for each type of labor across sectors is equal to labor supply, which is fixed since I




j = (1− µ0)Lj (2.10)
where Lj is region j’s fixed endowment of labor and I used that labor in the
non-traded sector is constant and equal to µ0Lj.
To express the traded goods market clearing conditions in a simple way it is






















8See Anderson and Yotov (2012).
9This formula only holds under zero tariff revenue. I assume that the central government runs
a balanced budget so that the decrease in tariff revenue after a reduction in tariffs is compensated
by an equal increase in government transfers. I leave the analysis of the effect of changes in tariff
revenue for future research.
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where Xkij is region j’s expenditure on region i in sector k, and Ekj is total
expenditure in region j in sector k. The second equality in equation 2.11 uses
equation 2.9.






πkijµkwjLj k = 1, ..., K (2.12)
where the left-hand side is the wage bill of sector k, which is equal to the
sector’s revenue due to zero profits in equilibrium. The right hand side is equal to
the sum of expenditures of all destination markets j on sector k goods proceeding
from region i, where πkijµkwjLj = Xkij.10
Equations 2.10 and 2.12 form a system of N + N × K equations (N labor
market clearing conditions and N × K goods market equilibrium conditions) in
N +N ×K variables (N regional wages and N ×K sectoral labor allocations). The
equilibrium of this economy is defined next.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a set of wages {wi, . . . , wN} and sectoral labor
allocations
{















1. Labor markets clear (equation 2.10 holds)
2. Goods market clear (equation 2.12 holds)
By Walras’ Law, one equilibrium condition in a region is redundant. Therefore,
the model can be solved up to a normalization.
10It can easily be shown that labor market clearing (equation 2.10) together with manufacturing
goods market equilibrium (equation 2.12) imply balanced trade.
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2.3 Decomposing regional wage changes
A region’s wage elasticity to a trade shock is a parameter of interest to evaluate
the impact of trade on local economies. For instance, Autor et al. (2013) find
that U.S. Commuting Zones at the 75th percentile of exposure to Chinese import
growth experience a 0.8 % larger fall in log earnings in the period 2000-2007 com-
pared to Commuting Zones at the 25th percentile. Kovak (2013) finds that a 10
percentage-points larger price decline in a region–induced by tariff reduction–implies
a 4 percentage-points larger wage decline. As I explained in the Introduction, these
estimations do not take linkages between regions into account.11 In this section I
use the model in section 2.2 to decompose the wage change to a sector-specific tariff
shock. This decomposition incorporates regional trade linkages and it takes into
account the changes in endogenous variables in every region.
Consider a change in τ s, the ad-valorem tariff factor that Home applies to
ROW in sector s. Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions in equation
2.12 yields an implicit formula for wage changes. To simplify notation, x̂ = d ln x
denotes the log change of x. I decompose the wage change of any region that
produces good s, into three effects
ŵi = DEi + PEi + SEi (2.13)
11Using the treatment-effects lexicon, this type of analysis relies on the stable unit treatment
value assumption (or SUTVA). Therefore, it assumes away any linkages or spillovers between
treated units (regions in this case).
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The first one, which I call direct effect, is the effect of the tariff change that
operates directly on prices, holding constant wages and sectoral employment in every
region, including region i. I denote the second component, partial effect, which is
the effect of the tariff change that operates through changes in wages and in sectoral
employment in region i, holding constant wages and sectoral employment in other
regions 6= i. The third one, which I call spillover effect, comprises the effect on
the wages of region i of changes in wages and sectoral employment in every region
except for region i itself.12 Each of these effects is given by










































is the share of sales to location j in location i’s total
revenue in sector s.13 The direct effect is a price effect that is not mediated by any
12Equation 2.14 also applies to isomorphic models like Armington or Eaton and Kortum (2002)
in which expenditures shares do not depend on sectoral labor Lki .
13Note that the decomposition is valid as long as region i produces good s, the good affected by
the shock. If region i does not produce the good, then ξkij = 0 for all j and all terms are equal to
zero. However, the wage elasticity is not zero in this case since the changes in endogenous variables
have an effect on region i wages through the goods market clearing conditions in the rest of the
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change in wages or employment. Suppose the tariff that Home applies to products
from ROW in sector s falls, this implies a fall in the prices that Home consumers
pay for imported products in sector s, generating a substitution from domestic to
imported goods. For a producer in region i, this generates a loss in her market
share in every region at Home, including region i itself. This direct marginal loss
in revenue is equal to the sum of the expenditure shares that each domestic market
j allocates to sector s goods imported from the ROW, πsRj, weighted by the share
of sales to each domestic market j in location i’s total revenue in sector s, ξsij, with∑
j ξ
s
ij = 1. This effect is higher when domestic locations that have high import
penetration from the rest of the World in sector s (this is, high πsRj) also tend to
have a high weight in region i’s revenue in sector s (this is, high ξkij).14 To satisfy
the zero profit condition, and given that all other endogenous variables are held
constant, wages in region i must fall. The partial effect is the sum of three effects.
The first term is negative because when region i wages decrease, region i goods
become cheaper, therefore increasing demand from all markets to which it sells
its products. This effect is greater the smaller is the share of region i in region j’s
expenditure (the smaller is πsij) weighted by ξsij.15 The second term is an expenditure
effect. Since expenditures are monotonically related to wages, a decrease in wages
in region i implies a decrease in expenditure. This affects region i’s demand for
sector s goods more negatively if region i producers sell a high proportion of goods
sectors in which region i is a producer. See Appendix A.1 for the total differentiation of the system
of equations that define an equilibrium.
14In addition, this effect increases with the elasticity of substitution σk since a higher σk implies
a higher price elasticity of demand.
15The size of the effect is decreasing in πsij becauseπSij is concave in wi.
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to their local market (high ξkii). Finally, the last term is the effect of changes in
hours worked in sector s, which are monotonically related to the number of varieties
(firms) produced in the sector. If the number of varieties in sector s in region i
decrease, competition for producers decreases dampening the initial effect of tariffs
on wages
The intuition behind the spillover effect is analogous to the intuition behind the
partial effect, with the exception that the sign of the wage change term is negative.
When wages in a region different from i decrease, this generates more competition
for region i producers and, other things equal, wages in region i have to decrease to
restore zero profits.
I further decompose the direct and partial effects into own-region effects and
the effect of linkages to other regions:
DEi = (σs − 1) ξsiiπsRi︸ ︷︷ ︸
own








PEi = − (σs − 1) [ξsii (1− πsii)] ŵi + ξkiiÊi − (ξsiiπsii) L̂si︸ ︷︷ ︸
own
(2.18)












 L̂si︸ ︷︷ ︸
linkages
.
In the case of the direct effect, the term labeled “own” reflects that a tariff
reduction makes producers in region i face more competition in their own region.
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This effect is more negative the higher is the import share from the ROW in region i,
πRi, and the higher is the share of exports of region i to itself, ξii. The term labeled
“linkages” captures that when tariffs decrease, producers from region i face more
competition in other domestic regions.16 In the extreme case that region i does not
export to any other domestic region, ξii would be equal to 1 and the “linkages” term
would be zero.
The same type of reasoning can be applied to the partial effect in equation
2.18. A part of the effect can be attributed to changes in region i that affect region
i through sales to itself. For example, the first term in the term labeled “own”
captures that a decrease in wages, makes region i’s goods cheaper for consumers
in region i, which increases sales of region i to itself and counteracts the initial
negative effect on wages of the tariff shock. The first term of the “linkages” term
captures that a decrease in wages makes region i’s goods cheaper for consumers in
other domestic regions. The own effect has an extra term that the linkages effect
does not have, which is an income effect. When wages decrease due to the tariff
change, incomes in region i decrease and this depresses sales of producers from i to
their own region even further.
2.4 The wage elasticity and employment composition
In this section I derive a reduced form employment composition measure from the
decomposition formula for regional wage changes in equations 2.14-2.16. I define a
16Mathematically, this effect is derived from the differentiation of πsij (j 6= R, i) with respect to
τs. Therefore, the linkage effect takes place even if the trade cost between regions i and j does
not change.
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parameter called the partial-equilibrium wage elasticity and I state the necessary
assumptions to go from that parameter to an employment weighted average of the
shock. I show these assumptions are incompatible with assumptions on trade costs.
2.4.1 The partial-equilibrium wage elasticity
I define a parameter that I call partial-equilibrium elasticity.17 This is the elasticity
of wages in region i setting the change in all the endogenous variables in other
regions to zero: dwh = dLkh = 0, ∀h 6= i. I denote x̃ = dxx
τs
dτs
the elasticity of a
variable, x, with respect to a tariff change in sector s. The partial equilibrium wage
































. The different terms in equation 2.19 are
related to the direct and partial effects in equations 2.14 and 2.15. The first term
in the numerator, analogously to the direct effect in equation 2.14, captures that
the partial-equilibrium wage elasticity is higher if markets that are an important
source of revenue for i tend to have a high expenditure shares on ROW goods. The
second term in the numerator captures a competition effect.18 If tariffs decrease,
the number of varieties (firms) in sector s in region i decrease, which decreases
competition for producers in that sector and that region and dampens the negative








17I borrow this terminology from Monte et al. (2015).
18Sectoral employment and varieties are linearly related by equation 2.8.
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in the denominator is what multiplies region i’s wage changes in equation 2.15 and
captures that lower wages in region i–as a consequence of a decrease in tariffs–
make region i’s producers more competitive, dampening the initial negative effect
of the tariff change on wages. Finally, ξii multiplies region i’s expenditure changes
in equation 2.15 and captures that lower lower wages in region i as a consequence
of a decrease in tariffs, decrease expenditure of region i’s consumers, amplifying the
initial negative effect of the tariff change on wages.
Equation 2.19 is not in closed form since it depends on the sectoral elasticities
of hours, L̃si . With a high number of sectors, a closed form expression becomes large.
Therefore, in the next paragraph I study a two sectors case.
Two Sectors Case To obtain a closed form solution for the partial elasticity, I
analyze the case where there are two traded sectors, k = {1, 2}, and a tariff shock
at Home that only affects sector 1.19 The system of equations that determines the
































where 1 [k = s] is the indicator function. Therefore, the first term is only active
for sectors that experience a direct tariff shock. The equation in the second row is
the total derivative of the labor market clearing condition equation 2.10. Solving
19Autor et al. (2013) model has two manufacturing sectors as well.
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The partial equilibrium wage elasticity is increasing in ∑j 6=R ξ1ijπ1Rj, which
captures the direct effect of the shock. In addition, the elasticity is increasing in
L1i /Li, the share in total employment of the sector affected by the shock. The
higher is this share, more workers reallocate from sector 1 to sector 2 after the
shock. Finally, the elasticity is decreasing in ∑j ξ1ijπ1ij and increasing in ∑j ξ2ijπ2ij.
These terms multiply the elasticity of sectoral employment in equation 2.19 and,
since employment and varieties are linearly related, they determine the magnitude
of the impact due to the change in the number of varieties in each sector. When there
is a decrease in tariffs in sector 1, the number of varieties in the sector decreases,
which decreases competition in the sector, dampening the initial impact of tariffs.
To satisfy labor market clearing, the number of varieties in sector 2 has to increase
and this is the reason why the partial wage elasticity is increasing in ∑j ξ2ijπ2ij.
With data on sectoral elasticities of substitution, expenditure shares and rev-
enue shares, the partial elasticity of regional wages with respect to tariffs can be
computed for every region without the need of solving the full model. With data
on tariff changes, wage changes can be predicted. However, this is not the approach
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taken in the empirical literature which resorts to a regression of wage changes on an
employment-weighted average of shocks.
2.4.2 From partial-equilibrium elasticities to employment-
weighted averages of shocks
As I reviewed in Chapter 1, several authors use a regression approach based on varia-
tion in regional trade exposure to asses the impact of trade shocks on regional wages.
I formulate a set of assumptions on expenditure and revenue shares that, staring
from the expression of a partial equilibrium elasticity, allow Autor et al. (2013) to
arrive to an estimating equation.20 These assumptions pertain to endogenous ob-
jects of the model, like expenditure and revenue shares. I show that assumptions on
fundamentals like trade costs can yield the same outcomes for expenditure shares
but not for revenue shares.
From equation 2.21 I define the partial-equilibrium wage change due to a tariff










 τ̂ k (2.22)
where x̂ = dx/x denotes the proportional change in variable x. The partial-
equilibrium wage change, ŵPEi , is equal to the partial wage elasticity multiplied by
the tariff change.
Assumption 1. gki = α, i ∈ Home
20Some of the assumptions are not made explicit in their paper.
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gki is referred by Autor et al. (2013) as a “general equilibrium adjustment
factor”. Assumption 1 states it does not vary across regions in the Home country.
When tariff shocks occur in multiple sectors, it is also required that it does not vary
across sectors either.
Assumption 2. πkRj = πkRH , j ∈ Home
Assumption 2 states expenditures shares πkRj are constant across domestic
regions (j ∈ H). This implies that every domestic region (j) allocates the same
share of expenditure in sector k to goods proceeding from the ROW.
Assumption 3. ξkij = ξkiH , i, j ∈ Home
Assumption 3 states revenue shares ξkij are constant across domestic destina-
tions (j ∈ H). This implies that the share of revenue received by producers in
region i in sector k that corresponds to goods sold to region j is the same across all
domestic destinations j.















(σ1 − 1) τ̂ k (2.23)
where RkiH is the revenue received by region i in sector k that corresponds to
goods sold to any region j ∈ Home and Rki is total revenue received by region i in
sector k.
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Assumption 4. R1iH/X1H ≈ L1i /L1H , i ∈ Home
The share of region i in total Home purchases in industry k can be approxi-
mated by the share of region i in Home employment in industry k








(the revenue shares are equal to
the shares of shipments ) and Lki /qki equals a constant. These properties in addition









where, using Autor et al. (2013) notation, ÂkR = − (σ1 − 1) τ̂ k is the change in
the export supply capability of the ROW due to a change in the tariff Home applies
to ROW goods in sector k. 21
Finally, assume:
Assumption 5. ∆XkRH = XkRHÂkR
The change in Home imports in sector k equals initial imports times the
change in the export supply capability of the ROW. This proportionality between
changes in tariffs and changes in expenditures does not hold in the model and










can see that keeping prices, varieties and expenditure constant it is the case that
X̂kij = − (σk − 1) τ̂ kij, but these variables vary endogenously after the change in tar-
iffs. Assumption 5 is needed even is assumptions 1 to 4 hold. To see why, consider
21The model can accommodate different sources of shocks like: changes in tariffs, sectoral
employment, tariffs or productivity of the ROW so the general formula used in ADH for this
variable is: ÂkR = L̂kR − (σk − 1)
(
ŵR + β̂kR + τ̂k
)
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the case where the home country consists of one region, so there is no within coun-
try heterogeneity in revenue and expenditure shares. Even in this extreme case, the
gravity equation implies that changes in imports are not linearly related to changes
in tariffs.22









To arrive to an estimating equation it is necessary to assume that there are
other factors unobservable to the econometrician that affect wages at the same time
as the shock occurs, which are captured by a stochastic error term (εi):






is an employment-weighted change in imports, as
defined in Autor et al. (2013) .
Equation 2.26 can be generalized to tariff changes in several sectors by replac-







, which is a weighted sum of sectoral trade





22Autor et al. (2013) are not explicit about Assumption 5 . However, it is needed to go from
the formula for ÂkR to an estimating equation based on changes in import penetration as they
estimate.
23The system in equation 2.20 can be generalized to accommodate shocks in multiple sectors.
As I explain when I state assumption 1, when the shocks occur in several sectors, the general
equilibrium adjustment factor, gki , has to be equal not only across regions but also across sectors.
Under this modified assumption and assumptions 2 to 5, it can be shown that equation 2.26 holds.
See Appendix A.2 for a proof.
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Other authors, like Kovak (2013) and Topalova (2010) have used trade liber-
alization episodes, so the shock is directly observable. In Autor et al. (2013) this
is not the case since the source of the shock is an unobservable change in foreign
productivity. When the shock is observable, this version of equation 2.26 can be
estimated:






τ̂ k, is an employment-weighted tariff change in region i.
The assumptions I stated involve endogenous variables like expenditure and
revenue shares. An important question is if it is possible to arrive to the same
outcomes making assumptions on fundamentals of the model instead, such as trade
costs. The following proposition states that assuming that trade costs do not vary
across regions at Home does yield constant trade shares.
Definition 2. Trade costs in sector k are homogeneous if: the cost of shipping
good k from region i to region j is the same for all Home regions i, j (this is,
κkij = κkH for all i, j) and the cost of shipping good k from the Rest of the World to
a Home region i is the same for all Home regions (this is, κkRi = κkR for all i).
Proposition 3. Suppose trade costs in sector k are homogeneous, then Assumption
2 holds. This is, πkRi = πkRH . In addition, πkij = πkih, i, j, h ∈ Home.
Proof. Under homogeneity of trade costs, the expenditure share of region i on ROW



















)1−σk + LkR (wRκkR/βkR)1−σk (2.28)
which is the same for any region i ∈ Home. So πkRj = πkRH .
In addition, homogeneity implies the expenditure share of region j on region


















)1−σk + LkR (wRκkR/βkR)1−σk (2.29)
which is the same for any region j ∈ Home. So πkij = πkih.
Proposition 1 states that assuming homogeneous trade costs across domestic
regions, implies that expenditure shares are the same for all domestic regions. Thus,
if region i imports 25% of sector k goods from region j, then region h also imports
25% of sector k goods from region j. However, the following proposition shows
homogeneity of trade costs is not enough to ensure the same result holds for revenue
shares.
Proposition 4. Homogeneity of trade costs in sector k is not sufficient for Assump-
tion 3 to hold.
Proof. The ratio of revenue shares in sector k in region i from sales to regions j and







where I used that, by proposition 1: πkij = πkih. Assumptions on trade costs are
not sufficient to ensure that ξkij = ξkih since this would require that wjLj = whLh.
As the proof of Proposition 2 shows, equality of revenue shares (ξkij = ξkih )
requires equality of nominal incomes (wjLj = whLh). Aside from knife-edge com-
binations of productivity and size that would yield this result, assuming equal size
of regions is not enough since wages would vary across regions due to differences in
productivity. Assuming productivities do not vary across regions, would yield that
labor shares do not vary across regions, which is precisely the type of variation used
in the exposure approach.
2.5 An illustration using simulations
In this section I explore how accurately partial elasticities measure the impact of
trade shock on local wages. In other words, I analyze how costly is it to ignore
spillovers between regions. The difference between partial and general equilibrium
elasticities depends on the specific parameter configuration of the Home economy
and the Rest of the World. Therefore, I compare partial equilibrium and general
equilibrium elasticities under different initial geography configurations.
For simplicity, I analyze the case of two regions in the Home country and a
region called Rest of the World, denoted i = {1, 2, R}, and two sectors, denoted












. With this vector I calculate expenditure and revenue shares that, together
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using equation 2.21. Then, I shock the Home economy with







. I use the new wages the model predicts to calculate the general-
equilibrium elasticity, which I compare to the partial equilibrium elasticity.
A comparison between predicted wages using partial elasticities and predicted
wages using the exposure approach is not possible in this simple example since the
exposure approach requires running a regression, and that is not possible with only
two regions in the Home country.24 However, we can compare the differences in
employment shares with the differences in partial elasticities. I show that partial
equilibrium elasticities can be different in the two regions at home while labor shares
are the same. This suggests there are cases in which labor shares cannot capture
the variation in the actual partial effect of the shock.25
The reduced form approach focuses on regional variation in the sectoral com-
position of employment as the only factor leading to differences in the sensitivity
of shocks. This approach neglects other factors, like distance to other markets as
possible explanations. If trade costs vary with distance, then distance affects wages
and expenditure shares, and therefore, general equilibrium and partial equilibrium
elasticities. To get a sense of how distance affects these elasticities, I start with sym-
metric regions and progressively increase the distance of region 2 to both region 1
24The purpose of a regression approach is to evaluate how much of the variation in wage changes
can be explained by the variation in initial conditions as captured, for example, by employment
composition. With only two regions, there is not enough variation in initial conditions. I perform
this type of exercise in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 when I take the model to the Brazilian data.
25In Appendix A.4 I provide a formal proof that a regression of wage changes on employment
exposure gives a biased estimator of the partial-equilibrium elasticity.
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and to the ROW. This makes trade between region 2 and the other regions costlier.
For each level of distance, I solve for wages and sectoral employment and then I
shock trade costs to obtain the general equilibrium elasticity and compare it to the
partial-equilibrium elasticity. I do this both for aggregate shocks (that affect both
regions at Home) and for region-specific shocks that affect one region at a time.
I report the parameter values I use in the simulations in Appendix A.3. I
start with symmetric regions that are at a distance of 1 km. from one another and
then progressively increase distance to a maximum of 3 km. The cost of shipping
goods within region 2 is kept constant. In addition, both sectors are symmetric,
the elasticities of substitution, Cobb-Douglas shares, parametrization of trade costs,
and productivities are the same for all region-sectors. This implies that as the
distance of region 2 to the other regions increases, equilibrium wages change but
not equilibrium sectoral employment.
Figure 2.1 shows the response to a national-level shock in sector 1. The shock
consists of a tariff reduction of 5% in both regions 1 and 2. When regions are
symmetric (i.e. when distance on the x-axis equals 1 km.), regions 1 and 2 have the
same values of the wage elasticity. As region 2 becomes more remote, it has a higher
actual elasticity. This result goes against the intuition in some reduced form analyses
that incorporate distance as a factor that dampens the impact of trade shocks (see
for example, Chiquiar et al. (2015)). In addition, the figure shows that partial
elasticities do not provide a correct ranking of regions in terms of sensitivity to the
shock when distance is greater than 1.5. In this interval, the true elasticity is higher
for region 2 while the partial elasticity is higher for region 1. Why does the more
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remote region has a higher sensitivity to tariff changes? The intuition behind this
result can be understood with Figure 2.2: the difference between regional elasticities
is smaller in the left panel figure. This means that region 2 is more affected by wage
changes in region 1 than region 1 is by wage changes in region 2. Also, as region
2 becomes more remote the elasticities to a shock in region 1 increase while the
elasticities to a shock in region 2 decrease. The reason is that as region 2 becomes
more remote the equilibrium relative wage of region 1 versus region 2 increases, so
region 1 becomes a bigger market.
In the previous exercise, the employment composition does not vary as region
2 becomes more remote: the share of sector 1 in total employment is 1/2 in both
regions. Therefore, if we rank the regions’ sensitivity to shocks based on employment
composition we obtain that both regions are equally sensitive while the simulation
of the model shows that region 2 is, in fact, more sensitive.
The previous example has parameter values such that regions are diversified
(i.e. they produce both goods 1 and 2). It is interesting to analyze cases where
the regions are completely specialized in one sector, because this shows there is
still a spillover to the region that does not produce the good affected by the shock.
Figure 2.3 shows a completely specialized home economy. Region 1 is 10 times more
productive in good 1 than in good 2, and region 2 is 10 times more productive in
good 2.26 An approach based on employment composition, would conclude that
region 2 is not exposed at all to the shock. The figure shows, as expected, that
26I choose these values to guarantee that for any value of distance in the x-axis, region 1 is
completely specialized in good 1 while region 2 is completely specialized in good 2.
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region 2 is less affected than region 1. However, its wage elasticity is far from zero,
and the difference between both elasticities decreases with the remoteness of region
2 because, as I explained before, region 1 becomes a more important market.
2.6 Conclusion
In this section I laid out a standard trade model to understand the mechanics of wage
changes when regions in a Home country trade with each other and with the ROW. I
decomposed wage changes after a sector-specific trade cost shock in several channels
and I stated the assumptions that are necessary to go from this decomposition to an
employment-composition based measure. Importantly, I showed these assumptions
are incompatible with assumptions on trade costs. Finally, I used simulations to
show that reduced form measures can yield, under certain parameter configurations,
an incorrect ordering of which region is more affected.
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2.7 Figures

















1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Distance between region 1 and regions 2 and RoW (km)
W Elast R1 W Part Elast R1
W Elast R2 W Part Elast R2
Notes: Wage elasticity as a result of a 5% decrease in Home tariffs applied to
ROW in sector 1 as a function of the distance between region 2 and regions 1 and
ROW (in km). All regions are completely diversified. The ratio of employment
in sector 1 to employment in sector 2 is equal to 1/2 in both Home regions.




















1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Distance between region 1 and regions 2 and RoW (km)
W Elast R1 W Elast R2
Notes: Wage elasticity to a 5% decrease in region
1 tariffs applied to ROW in sector 1 as a function





















1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Distance between region 1 and regions 2 and RoW (km)
W Elast R1 W Elast R2
Notes: Wage elasticity to a 5% decrease in region
2 tariffs applied to ROW in sector 1 as a function
of the distance between region 2 and regions 1 and
ROW (in km).
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1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Distance between region 1 and regions 2 and RoW (km)
Region 1 Region 2
Notes: Wage elasticity a result of 5% decrease in Home tariffs applied to ROW in
sector 1 as a function of the distance between region 2 and regions 1 and ROW
(in km). Region 1 is completely specialized in sector 1 and region 2 is completely
specialized in sector 2.
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Chapter 3: Trade shocks, linkages, and wages in
Brazil
3.1 Introduction
The simulations in Chapter 2 suggest that employment composition can be a poor
predictor of which regions in a country are more affected by a nationwide trade
shock. However, we may wonder how problematic this is for an actual country. To
answer this, I calibrate the model to the Brazilian economy in 1991, at the begin-
ning of a massive trade liberalization process. In section 3.3 I perform a series of
counterfactual exercises using the structure of the model and I show that, in fact,
employment composition explains a relatively small share of the variation in coun-
terfactual wage changes. Therefore, I propose a linkage exposure measure derived
from the model and I show it explains a significantly higher share of the variation in
counterfactual wage changes. In section 3.4 I propose an estimation strategy closely
related to the model and I show trade exposure is a valid instrument for changes in
domestic market access. Next, I estimate the elasticity of wages to domestic market
access and I compare the predictions of different reduced form measures with the
predictions using the estimated elasticity and counterfactual market access changes.
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3.2 Data sources and measurement
This section describes the data sources I use for the quantitative exercises and the
econometric estimations in this chapter and in Chapter 4. The reader can find more
details about each variable in Appendix B. The main unit of analysis is a Brazilian
microregion, which is a subdivision of Brazilian states defined by the Brazilian In-
stitute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). A microregion groups together several
municipalities in proximity that share common social and economic characteristics.
There are a total of 494 microregions in Brazil that can be defined in a geograph-
ically consistent way across the 1991 and 2000 Demographic Censuses using the
mapping by Kovak (2013). Throughout the analysis, I also refer to microregions
simply as “regions”. Table 3.1 shows there is a large degree of heterogeneity across
microregions in area, distance to sea ports, employment, and wages. Figure 3.1
shows there is also high variation in the shares of manufacturing employment across
microregions.
Wages and employment data are from the Brazilian Demographic Censuses
of 1991 and 2000, conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statis-
tics (IBGE).1,2 Individuals are asked to report, among other variables, the monthly
1These datasets are also employed by Kovak (2013), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2014), and Adao
(2015), among others.
2Another source for data on earnings is the household annual survey (Pesquisa Nacional de
Amostras por Domicilio, PNAD), which is also conducted by the IBGE. I do not use this dataset
since its sample size is not large enough to conduct an analysis at the local labor market level. A
solution to the small sample size would be to use several cross sections of states. I do not follow this
approach since it would imply using short-run variation in tariffs. Although in section 3.4.1 I argue
that tariff changes between the beginning and the end of trade liberalization were independent of
political economy considerations, this argument may not apply to short run fluctuations in tariffs.
However, using long-run changes has the downside that other aggregate shocks can be confounded
with tariffs. I address these risks in section 3.4.1.
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earnings from their main job and weekly hours worked, their industry of employ-
ment, and the municipality where they live.3 With this data, I assign individuals
to regions and I obtain Lki as the sum of yearly hours worked across all workers in
region i and sector k and wi as the average hourly wage across all workers in region
i.4
The industry classifications are not uniform across the different data sources,
so I use several mappings to arrive to my own classification which consists of one
non-traded sector and 12 traded sectors. Both the crosswalks and my classification
are described in detail in Appendix B.
Average ad-valorem tariffs applied by Brazil at the sectoral level for the period
1990-1998 are from Kume et al. (2000).5 Tariffs were reduced substantially between
1987 and 1998, as Figure 3.2 shows. The high levels before 1990 should be inter-
preted with caution since tariff redundancy was very high due to special customs
regimes that waived or reduced import duties for particular goods, as Kume et al.
(2000) explains.6 Trade liberalization reduced both tariff levels and their dispersion,
as Table 3.2 shows.7
3Since the industry classification varies across censuses, I use the crosswalk in Kovak (2013) as
described in Appendix B.
4My measure of regional wages differs from Kovak (2013), since he uses region fixed effects
from a Mincer regression. In section 3.4.4 I report results using his measure as a robustness check.
5This dataset is also used by Gonzaga et al. (2006) and Kovak (2013).
6The authors also report that during 1990 the list of forbidden imports was abolished along
with the majority of the special customs regimes. Simultaneously, tariff levels were adjusted to
provide equivalent levels of protection as those existing before the reform. By the middle of the
year, tariff redundancy was eliminated so tariffs became the main instrument to protect the local
industry.
7At the tariff line level, the simple average tariff was reduced from 50.6% (1988) to 14.2%
(1993), and the standard deviation was reduced from 26.2 to 9.5 Kume et al. (2000)
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I obtain the elasticities of substitution between varieties in each sector, σk,
from the data in Broda and Weinstein (2006).8 As Table B.1 shows, they range
from 2.53 in Paper to 3.65 in Chemicals without considering Footwear and Leather,
which has a value of 14.64.
Trade flows between Brazilian states at the sector level are from Vasconcelos
and Oliveira (2006) and trade flows between Brazil and the ROW at the sector
level are obtained from the AliceWeb System (supported by the Secretary of Inter-
national Trade, SECEX). The interstate trade data corresponds to the year 1999.
Unfortunately, there is no data on interstate trade at the sector level for previous
years.
I calculate geographic distances between regions in Brazil and between regions
and their nearest sea port using the Haversine distance formula. The formula for
the distance of a region to itself, dii, is described in Appendix B.1.5.
I obtain ROW wages and sectoral hours worked in 1991 and 2000 using value
added at the sector level for 50 countries from UNIDO Industrial Statistics, and
total hours worked and GDP from Penn World Tables version 8.1.
To calculate Cobb Douglas shares I first obtain the share of non-traded sector
in total value added, µ0, from the Brazilian National Accounts (IBGE), which is
equal to 0.7 in 1991 and 0.76 in 2000.9 I calculate the Cobb Douglas shares for traded
sectors (k = 1...K) as the domestic absorption in a sector divided by total value
8Appendix B.1.3 and B.1.7 contain details about the industry crosswalks between the data in
Broda and Weinstein (2006) and the Brazilian Census.
9Since in the model the share of labor in the non-traded sector is constant across regions and
equal to µ0 (see Section 2.2, Equilibrium), I adjust manufacturing hours in all Brazilian regions
and in the ROW so that L0i = µ0Li.
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, where V AkBRA =∑
i∈BRAwiL
k
i is the value added by labor in sector k in Brazil and is defined as in
the model and calculated using the Census data, andMkBRA and XkBRA are Brazilian
imports and exports in sector k, obtained from data source mentioned above and
adjusted by the share of the value of production accruing to wages in each sector.10 I
obtain the ROW Cobb-Douglas shares in traded sectors in a consistent way so that











MkROW = XkBRA and XkROW = MkBRA. The Cobb-Douglas shares for Brazil and for
ROW are displayed in Table B.1 and the sectoral share of imports and exports of
value added are shown in Table B.2.
3.3 Counterfactuals
I perform several counterfactual exercises for Brazil. These experiments allow me
first, to quantify the importance of the different channels through which a reduction
in tariffs can affect regional wages by using the decomposition derived in section
10Since in the model the only factor of production is labor and there are no intermediates, I
measure the value of production using the data on labor income from the Census. Given that
my calibration targets the observed ratio of imports to value added (which equals the value of
production in the model), I calculate the Cobb-Douglas shares so that they are consistent with
total absorption in the data. Otherwise, markets would not clear. Ideally, I should use only
imports and exports of final goods to obtain the Cobb Douglas shares. However, there is no data
on Brazilian exports and imports discriminated by final and intermediate goods at the level of
sectoral aggregation I use. Therefore, I adjust imports and exports by multiplying them by the
share of the total value of production accruing to wages in each sector (this share is obtained from
the input-output tables by IBGE). I also adjust sector level exports to eliminate the aggregate
trade deficit, since in the model trade is balanced. Other papers in the literature either use data
on intermediate exports and imports, such as the work by Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014)
who use OECD data, or they model intermediates and use input-output data, such as Caliendo
and Parro (2014) and Caliendo et al. (2015).
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2.4, and second, to evaluate the capacity of different exposure measures to predict
wage changes.
3.3.1 Approach
To generate the counterfactuals I calibrate the parameters of the model to match
the initial equilibrium of the Brazilian economy in 1991. Next, I apply a trade cost
shock and I solve for regional nominal wages and sectoral employment in the new
equilibrium. I also solve for the change in the price index, which allows me to obtain
real wage changes. In several applications, the calibration of the model is not a nec-
essary stage for obtaining counterfactual wages. For example, the method of solving
the model in changes, developed by Dekle et al. (2008), would only require data on
initial wages, sectoral employment, and expenditure shares (πkij) to solve for regional
wage changes. However, there are many interesting applications in which the full
matrix of expenditure shares is not available. This typically occurs when bilateral
trade is not observed at the level of the unit of analysis. For instance, in the case of
Brazil bilateral trade is available at the level of states but not at the level of smaller
units like microregions.11 When this is the case, we can use the structure of the
model and a parametrization of trade costs to calibrate unobserved parameters and
predict trade between units. A non-exhaustive list of authors employing procedures
similar to the one I use is: Fan (2015), Bartelme (2014), and Monte et al. (2015).
11For the level of disaggregation in the empirical application of this paper (12 industries), there
is no data on production at the state level. Therefore, the full matrix of expenditure shares is not
observed at the state level.
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I use 1991 as the initial year due to data availability. As I explained in section
B.1, the process of trade liberalization began in 1988 but it was not until 1990 that
tariff changes started to reflect actual changes in protection. Ideally, 1990 should
be the base year for the calibration. If observed wages in 1991 already reflect some
anticipation of future tariff reduction then, the counterfactual exercise in which I
reduce tariffs by the magnitude observed in 1991-1995, would overstate the change
in wages. Therefore, the absolute magnitude of wage changes should be interpreted
with caution. However, the main purpose of this section is to analyze how much
of the regional variation in wage changes across regions is explained by exposure
measures. Therefore, as long as anticipatory effects affect all regions in the same
way, the main results in this section would be unaffected.
Equations 2.12 and 2.10, together with equation 2.11 completely characterize
the equilibrium of the model. Given the values for the trade costs (κkij), region-
sector specific productivities (βki ), and Cobb Douglas shares (µk), wages and sectoral
employment in every region can be solved for. The solution algorithm is described
in Appendix A.5. In the next paragraphs I describe the procedure I use to calibrate
productivities and to parametrize trade costs.
I use the market clearing conditions in equation 2.12 together with 2.11 to
solve for N × S productivities (βki ) in 1991. For each sector there is a set of N
equations. Given regional wages (wi) in 1991, hours worked in each region and
sector (Lki ) in 1991, elasticities of substitution (σk), Cobb-Douglas shares (µk), and a
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parametrization of trade costs (κkij) as a function of distance, each set of N equations





up to a normalization.12
I obtain regional wages, region-sector employment, elasticities of substitution,
and Cobb-Douglas shares from the data as described in section 3.2. Regarding trade
costs, I follow the standard gravity literature by parametrizing trade costs between
regions as a function of distance. For any two regions i, j in Brazil, the domestic
trade cost has the following functional form Dkij = (distij)
δk where distij is the
bilateral distance between regions i and j.13 I estimate the elasticity of domestic
trade costs with respect to distance, δ, with a gravity equation for each sector using
data on trade flows between Brazilian states. I do not use the gravity equation
to estimate an international border effect but rather, I calibrate the border effect
together with productivities as I describe below. Taking logs of equation 2.9 in
stochastic form yields for each sector k
lnXkij = expki + impkj + ψk ln distij + εkij i, j ∈ BRA, k = 1...K (3.1)





)1−σk] is an exporter fixed effect, impkj = ln [Ekj (P kj )σk−1]
is an importer fixed effect, ψk = (1− σk) δk, and εkij is a stochastic error term. With
12I refer the reader to the proof of Proposition 3 in Monte et al. (2015).
13This parametrization assumes no border effect between Brazilian states. Since I use this
parametrization to predict trade between microregions, including a border effect in the trade cost
would imply assuming that the state level border effect is equal to the microregion level border
effect. Although there is evidence that there are border effects at the state and province level for
the U.S. and Canada (Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Anderson and Yotov (2010)), there
is not equivalent evidence for trade at a disaggregated level, such as a microregion. Therefore, I
exclude within country border effects from my parametrization.
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data on σk, and estimates of ψk , the distance elasticity δk = ψk/ (1− σk) can be
recovered. The origin fixed effect, expki , controls for region i’s number of varieties
and Mill prices in sector k. The destination fixed effect, impkj , controls for region j’s
aggregate expenditure in sector k, Ekj , and its price index in sector k, P kj . I estimate
ψk for each sector k using the Poisson Maximum Likelihood estimator developed by
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and I cluster standard errors by pairs of states. The de-
pendent variables are interstate trade flows in 1999. Since I use this parametrization
of trade costs to predict trade shares in 1991, the maintained assumption is that
between 1991 and 1999 the cost of shipping goods within Brazil did not change.14
The first column of Table 3.3 shows the coefficient of the log of distance, ψk, which
ranges from -0.35 in Footwear and Leather Apparel to -2.2 in Mining. The sec-
ond column reports the implied value of δk, the distance elasticity in the trade cost
function, given the sectoral elasticities of substitution displayed in Table B.1.15
With the estimated domestic distance elasticity we can predict trade costs
between any pair of Brazilian regions. To predict the trade cost between a Brazilian
region and ROW, I assume international trade costs for a Brazilian region i have the
following form: Iki,ROW = (distporti)
δk χk, where distporti is the distance between
region i and the nearest sea port in Brazil and χk is equal to one plus the tariff
equivalent of all border related costs, including tariffs. Note that both distance and
the border effect are symmetric, so Iki,ROW = IkROW,i. Since goods shipped to the port
14This assumption is supported by empirical studies that find that distance elasticities are stable
over time. See, for example, Anderson and Yotov (2010) on Canadian province trade.
15The number of observations differs across industries because not all states export all goods.
Since in the data there are 27 importing states but only 21 exporting states, the maximum number
of observation is 546 = 21 × (27 − 1). See Appendix B for more details on the interstate trade
data.
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are transported by land, I assume the distance elasticity is δk, the value I obtained
by estimating the gravity equation.
I calibrate a border effect for each sector χk to exactly match the Brazilian
observed ratio of imports to value added in each sector in 1991.16 Note that the
border effect could be estimated with a gravity equation by including trade flows
between states and ROW and a border dummy (Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)
and Anderson and Yotov (2010)). However, the predicted import penetration at the
country-sector level using an estimated border effect would not necessarily match the
one observed in the data. Since the effect of trade on wages is driven by expenditure
shares, it is important that expenditure shares match the data as closely as possible.
The calibrated border effect factors, χk, are shown in Table B.3. These are higher
than other estimates from the literature, such as those in Anderson and Yotov
(2010). The reason is that I measure distance to the ROW as the distance to the
nearest sea port, so I do not take into account the distance from the sea port to
destination countries. If I only used the distance coefficient, this would predict a
much higher level of imports (and exports) than is observed in the data. Therefore,
to match the observed ratio of imports to value added, the border effect has to be
higher.
I study asymmetric trade shocks that decrease the cost of shipping goods from
ROW to Brazil. In the first set of experiments, I decrease trade costs κkROW,BRA in
a one sector at a time by 1%. In the second experiment, I decrease trade costs in
16By doing this, I also match the ratio of exports to value added since Cobb Douglas shares are






all sectors at the same time by the amount implied by the tariff reduction that took
place in Brazil between 1991 and 1995, the period of trade liberalization. For this








where κkROW,BRA,91 are initial trade costs in 1991, calculated as described pre-
vious paragraphs using the formula κkROW,BRA,91 = (distporti)
δk χk91, and tk91 and
tk95 are the ad-valorem Brazilian tariffs in sector k in 1991 and 1995 respectively.
Equation 3.2 implies that a 1% reduction in the Brazilian tariff factor in sec-
tor k, yields a reduction of 1% in the trade cost, κkROW,BRA. The corresponding
reduction in trade flows is, by equation 2.9, of (1 − σk)%. A way to rational-







, where bkROW,BRA,95 is the tariff equiv-
alent of all border related costs other than tariffs and is not symmetric.17




(1+tk91) . Note that all sectors experienced tariff reductions between 1991 and
1995, except for Agriculture. The highest tariff reductions took place in Apparel (21
log percentage points) and Textiles (13 log percentage points). Between 1995-1998
17One advantage of assuming an initially symmetric border effect is that I do not need
data on applied tariffs by the ROW to perform the calibration and I only need applied tariff
changes by Brazil to calculate the trade shock. As a robustness check, I assumed that the ini-











, so that the non-tariff border effect, bk, is symmetric but the overall ini-
tial border effect, χk, is not. I calibrated a symmetric non-tariff border effect bk using data on
average applied ad-valorem tariffs by the ROW to Brazil from TRAINS. This dataset has a high
proportion of missing values in the early 1990s, so I did not use it for the benchmark calibration.
Qualitative results do not change using this alternative methodology. Results are available upon
request.
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there was a small reversal of trade reform to meet demands for more protection and
to keep imports at levels consistent with balanced trade. The government raised the
import tariffs for cars, motorcycles, bicycles, tractors, consumer electronics, fabrics,
blankets, and shoes. However, the Common External tariff of the MERCOSUR
prevented further changes in the tariff structure. Therefore, this period was the
one in which tariffs were more stable since the start of the trade reform process.
Throughout the paper, I consider tariff changes between 1991-1995, which is the
period with the most substantial change in tariffs.18,19
With the data on regional wages (wi) in 1991, hours worked in each re-
gion and sector (Lki ) in 1991, elasticities of substitution (σk), Cobb-Douglas shares
(µk), the calibrated productivities (βki ) and the updated trade costs after a shock
(κkROW,BRA,95), I use the equilibrium conditions of the model to solve for the counter-
factual regional wages after the shock normalizing the ROW wage to one both in the
initial and the final equilibrium. Therefore, counterfactual nominal wage changes
should be interpreted as normalized by ROW wage changes.20
18Kovak (2013) considers tariff changes between 1990 and 1995. Since the data for wages is from
1991, I use 1991 as the start year for tariff changes. None of the qualitative results of the paper
change when considering tariff changes between 1991 and 1998. For the counterfactual section,
results are available upon request. For the estimation, I report results in Section 3.4.4.
19During this period Brazil signed the MERCOSUR agreement with Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay. This agreement implied not only a reduction in applied tariffs by Brazil but also a
decrease in Brazilian export costs to member countries. In this dissertation, I focus on the increase
in import competition caused by Brazilian tariff reductions during the 1990s and I leave the analysis
of the consequences of increased export penetration to foreign markets for future research.
20The solution algorithm is described in Appendix A.5.
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3.3.2 A 1% import cost reduction in each sector
In this section I report the results for the first set of counterfactual experiments that
consist in reducing the trade costs for Brazil of importing goods from the ROW by
1%, one sector at a time, so κ̂kROW,BRA = −0.01.21 For each industry, I compute
employment and linkage exposure. The former is standard in the literature and I
derive the latter by decomposing wage changes.
3.3.2.1 Nominal wage decomposition
Table 3.5 shows in its first column nominal wage changes due to a 1% trade cost
reduction with the ROW in each sector.22 This shock causes nominal wages to
decline, since Brazilian regions face more competition from abroad. However, wage
responses vary depending on the sector that is affected by the shock. For example,
a 1% trade cost shock in Footwear and Leather causes a wage decline of 0.02 log
points while a 1% trade cost shock in Mineral Manufacturing or in Apparel causes
a wage decline two orders of magnitude smaller.
The next three columns report the decomposition of wage changes into its
components using equations 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16. The direct effect is in every case
negative, as expected, but the partial and spillover effects are positive. This means
that the adjustment in endogenous variables, namely wages and sectoral employ-
21The reason for doing a 1% reduction is that the decomposition in equations 2.13, 2.17, and
2.18 is only valid in a neighborhood of the initial equilibrium.
22The procedure I used is the following. I performed 12 different experiments in which I shocked
each of the sectors at a time. I solved for regional wage changes in every Brazilian microregion
and then I averaged across all regions weighting by the initial share of total hours worked in each
region. Therefore, results shown in Table 3.5 are weighted averages.
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ment, overturns the direct effect of the trade cost change on prices. The 5th column
shows that the share of the direct effect overturned by the sum of partial and spillover
effects ranges from 92.3% in Food to 99.7% in Mineral Manufacturing. Note that
not all the terms in equations 2.18 and 2.16 have the same sign. The ones with a
positive sign operate in the same direction as the direct effect–they tend to reduce
wages– while the ones with a negative sign work in the opposite direction. The fact
that in Table 3.5, PE and SE are positive means that the effects with a negative
sign dominate. These are the wage and sectoral employment terms in 2.18 and the
sectoral employment term in 2.16.23
To account for the importance of linkages to other regions, the last column of
Table 3.5 shows the share of the own region effect in the sum of the partial and the
direct effects, in equations 2.17 and 2.18. This share is never higher than 12% in
any sector. For example, this share is 11.3% in Paper. This means that 88.7% of
the direct and partial effects comes from linkages to other regions rather than the
own region. In Agriculture, Footwear and Leather, and Food this share is negative
because the own-region effect is positive, as shown in the column to the left.24 The
reason is that the terms with a negative sign in the own-region term in equation
2.18, overturn the effect of the term with a positive sign.
To my knowledge, the only other study to perform a decomposition of wage
changes in a general equilibrium trade model is Monte (2014). However, his model
23Sectoral employment changes, capture a variety effect (equation2.8). This effect is specific to
the Krugman (1980) model and does not occur in other isomorphic models like Eaton and Kortum
(2002), unless we assume there are externalities. I leave a comparison of this decomposition using
an isomorphic model for future research.
24Note from columns 2 and 3 in Table 3.5 that the sum of DE and PE is negative in every
sector.
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has free trade within the country and a uniform trade cost with the ROW, as
well as commuting links, which my model does not have. Therefore, the formula
for the wage decomposition is not directly comparable. It would be interesting in
future research to decompose wage changes in a context with both costly trade and
commuting or migration linkages.
3.3.2.2 Wages, exposure, and linkages
This section evaluates the contribution of two different measures of exposure to the
variation in counterfactual wage changes. The first measure, denoted by ETC, is
an employment-weighted trade cost change, the type of measure used in Topalova
(2010) and Kovak (2013).25 The second measure is a linkage-weighted trade cost
change, LTC. This measure is equal to the direct effect on wages of a trade cost
change with the rest of the World, as defined in equation 2.14. The formulas for












25Autor et al. (2013) measure exposure as an employment-weighted average of changes in import
penetration. I introduce a measure analogous to their measure in section 3.3.3 when I shock several
industries at the same time. In the context of a shock to only one industry, this measure and the
weighted trade cost change are collinear.
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ETC weights trade cost changes by the share of total traded employment in
region i that corresponds to employment in sector k.26 Even though ETC can be
derived from theory, it is not derived from the class of models that yield a gravity
equation for trade flows. The specific-factors model in Kovak (2013) assumes perfect
competition and no transport costs. Therefore, changes in regional prices are equal
to changes in tariffs. This is not the case in the model with a gravity structure for
trade flows.
The theory-consistent way of distributing the trade cost shock across regions is
using linkages as in LTC. This measure takes into account the structure of linkages
that the model predicts has a first order effect on local wages. Regardless, it is a
reduced-form measure since it does not take into account the feedback from changes
in endogenous variables: wi and Lki in all regions.
To my knowledge, there are two other studies that use linkage-based measures
of exposure. One is Stumpner (2015) who defines the trade demand shock faced by
a US region as a weighted sum of household leverage in all other regions, where the
weights are given by the share of exports to that region. My measure is different from
Stumpner (2015) since he considers the demand shock as exogenous, and therefore,
he only weights by export shares whereas I also weight by import shares. The other
is Monte et al. (2015) who use the partial elasticity of employment to productivity
shocks to predict changes in regional employment. My measure is different from
theirs in three aspects: first, I consider only the direct effect while they incorporate
26I use as a denominator total traded employment in the region and not total employment to be
consistent with the assumption I made for calibrating µ0: that the share of non-traded employment
is the same for all Brazilian regions. See section 3.3.1 and footnote 9 for details.
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other partial-equilibrium effects, second, since their model has commuting and mi-
gration, their measure incorporates other channels that are absent in my analysis,
and third, the type of shock they study is a region-specific productivity shock, so
the import weights are different. I also contribute to the analyses in those studies
by providing an interpretation of exposure measures as instruments for domestic
market access in Section 3.4.
Figures 3.3, and 3.4 show scatter plots of changes in nominal wages in the
vertical axis and the exposure measures in the horizontal axis. We expect the
correlation to be positive between ETC and LTC and wages since a decrease in
tariffs, increases competition and therefore, decreases wages. The solid lines are the
fit from a linear regression of nominal wage changes on exposure for each experiment.
The first thing to note from these figures is that the correlation between exposure
and wage changes does not always have the expected sign. Second, the employment-
based measure captures a small share of the variation in wage changes, as measured
by the R-squared of the regressions. ETC explains a median of 2% of the variation
in counterfactual wage changes and a maximum of 17% of this variation, in the
Agriculture sector, although the sign is negative. In some sectors, like Mining,
Mineral Manufacturing, Textile, and Food the explanatory power of this variable
is almost zero. The linkage-based measure, LTC, performs better in predicting
wage changes. This measure is, as expected, positively and strongly related to wage
changes except in two sectors: Mining and Plastic and Rubber. In these sectors,
general equilibrium effects, given by the terms PE and SE in equation 2.13, overturn
the sign of the correlation between LTC and changes in wages. But in the rest of the
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10 sectors it holds that regions with more negative exposure as measured by LTC,
have higher declines in wages. LTC explains a median of 44% of the variation
in counterfactual wage changes and a maximum of 86% of this variation, in the
Footwear and Leather sector.
To evaluate how much each measure contributes to the overall variation in
counterfactual wage changes, I estimate for each sector a linear model on a 3rd-
degree polynomial of all measures and decompose the R-squared coefficient. This
synthetic regression is given by








+ ei k = 1, .., 12 (3.5)
where ŵi,k is the counterfactual nominal wage change in region i due to a 1%












, and a2, a3 are
(3× 1) vectors of coefficients. Table 3.6 shows the results of the Shorrocks-Shapley
R-squared decomposition (see Shorrocks (1982) and Shorrocks (2013)).27 Model 1




= xki . For ten of the twelve sectors LTC
explains at least 75% of the variation explained by the model. ETC explains most
of the variation in Agriculture and Chemicals. Model 2 is a 3rd-degree polynomial
in each variable. Each column groups the contribution of the polynomial of each
27In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value provides a rule to distribute the total gains of a
game by calculating the marginal impact of each of the factors as they are eliminated successively,
and then averaging them over all the possible elimination sequences. In the case of the R-squared,
the Shapley value is the marginal contribution to the R-squared averaging over all possible sub-
models. In a model with two regressors, x1 and x2, one way to compute the marginal contribution
of x1 is to subtract from the overall R-squared the R-squared obtained when x1 is omitted from
the regression. The other way is to estimate the R-squared of a regression including x1 and not
x2, and subtract the R-squared of a regression from which both variables were omitted, which is,
zero. Averaging these two possibilities gives the Shapley contribution of x1.
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variable. In this case, for 11 sectors LTC explains at least 70% of the variation
explained by the model.
The exercises presented in this section suggest a link-based measure of expo-
sure is better at explaining the variation of counterfactual wage changes generated
by the model. The advantage of a measure like this is that it with trade data at the
regional level, it can be calculated without the need to solve the model and it can
be used to predict which regions are more affected by a trade cost shock.
To my knowledge, the only existing study that compares wage changes pre-
dicted using a model with linkages with those using employment exposure measures
is Monte (2014). However, his analysis is different because he focuses on a shock to
either all sectors, removing all trade barriers with the ROW or on a single NAICS
3-digit sector, "Computer and Electronics Product Manufacturing". Consistent with
my findings he finds a weak explanatory power of exposure. However, he finds the
sign is the expected one. By shocking each sector at a time, I find that in some sec-
tors the correlation can be negative. In addition, I propose a linkage-based measure,
LTC.
3.3.3 Trade liberalization
The previous experiments consisted in reducing trade costs one sector at time. How-
ever, in reality, these shocks frequently occur in several sectors simultaneously and
the magnitudes of the shocks vary across sectors. In this section I perform a trade
liberalization experiment and evaluate different exposure measures in that context.
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I reduce the trade cost of shipping goods from the ROW to Brazil by the actual
change in tariffs observed between 1991 and 1995 in Brazil (see Table 3.4).
The first row of Table 3.7 shows the distribution of counterfactual nominal
wage changes after the trade liberalization experiment. Nominal wages decrease in
every region, with a median reduction of -0.26 log points. The hours-weighted mean
across all regions is also equal to -0.26 log points.
Panel A of Figure 3.7 shows the geography of the counterfactual wage changes.
The most affected regions are the ones in the South and South East of the country.
These regions are located near Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais, the
biggest centers of economic activity in the country. Regions in the North West of
the country are more isolated from the shock, since they have fewer linkages to other
regions, and therefore, suffer smaller wage changes in the counterfactual exercise.
To evaluate the reduced form measures of exposure in this context, we need
to aggregate the measures from the sector and region level to the region level. The
model yields that the direct effect of each sectoral shock on wages is given by linkage
exposure, LTCki . I propose an ad hoc aggregation scheme for linkage exposure,











A theory-based way of aggregating the sectoral shocks to the region level is by
taking into account that in the data wages vary across sectors. Therefore, we can











 κ̂kROW,BRA k = 1...K, (3.7)


















ŵki and the approximation comes from the fact
that all the changes in endogenous variables are set to be equal to zero.
I denote by ELTCi this employment and linkage based measure of exposure,













I compare LTCi and ELTCi with the standard employment exposure, which

























is the counterfactual log change in the imports to value added
ratio in sector k in Brazil.
EMC is the measure most closely related to the definition of exposure in
Autor et al. (2013). In EMC the source of the shock is the change in nationwide
imports while in ETC and LTC it is the change in trade costs as a consequence
of the change in tariffs. Autor et al. (2013) use changes in imports because the
shock they analyze, the increase in Chinese productivity, is not directly observable.
Since import penetration changes are not observable at the commuting zone level,
the authors use the following measure: ∑Kk=1 LkiLkHome ∆MkHomeLi to allocate the change in




, proportionally to the share of that region




. To calculate this measure, I use the
counterfactual increase in the ratio of Brazilian imports to value added instead









. The reason is that the counterfactual value of imports does not have
a meaningful interpretation in the model since what drives changes in wages are
changes in import penetration.
Table 3.8 shows the correlation coefficient of the four exposure measures.
EMC is negatively correlated with the rest since decreases in trade costs drive
increases in import penetration. ELTC is more correlated with ETC than with
LTC.
I analyze the contribution of each measure to the variation in wage changes
using the following synthetic regression
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ŵi = b0 + b1Pol (Exposurei) + ei (3.12)
with Exposurei = {ETCi,EMCi, LTCi, ELTCi} and Pol is a polynomial that
is either 1-degree (linear) or 3rd- degree. Table 3.9 displays the regression output
for the standard exposure measures ETC and EMC and their polynomials. In the
linear specification in columns 1 and 5, ETC has a positive sign and EMC a negative
one, as expected. When included on their own, ETC and EMC explain 3.1% and
6.7% of the variation in wage changes respectively, which is small taking into account
that this regression uses counterfactual wage changes after a change in tariffs keeping
constant everything else. The R-squared of the regressions increases more than an
order of magnitude when including state fixed effects. This reflects that in the
model a great part of the variation in regional wages comes from geographic factors.
However, both measures lose explanatory power and significance. Columns 3, 4, 7,
and 8 show results for 3rd-degree polynomial in exposure. EMC remains significant
but ETC does not.
The results for the linkage-based measures of exposure are displayed in Table
3.10. In the linear specification in columns 1 and 5, both LTC and ELTC have
a positive and significant coefficient. When included on their own, they explain
25.6% and 11.4% of the variation in wages respectively, more than the what the
standard measures explain. As in the previous Table, controlling for state fixed
effects increases the R-squared of the regressions but, unlike in the previous Table,
the coefficients remain significant although with smaller coefficients (columns 2 and
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6). Using a polynomial does not improve the fit of the regression substantially and
even changes the sign of the coefficient for LTC .
Finally, Table 3.11 includes all the measures at the same time as regressors.
LTC and ELTC remain positive and significant whereas ETC becomes negative
and EMC loses significance. Table 3.12 reports the Shapley decomposition of the
R-squared of a regression that includes all the measures of exposure in linear form,
as in Column 1 of Table 3.11, and a third-degree polynomial of the measures. In the
linear specification in Panel A, linkage-based measures, LTC and ELTC combined
explain 30% of the variation in wage changes (83% of an R-squared equal to 0.36)
and in the polynomial specification they explain 37% (75% of an R-squared of 0.503).
In sum, the results in this section suggest that weighted averages of link-based
exposure measures are better suited for explaining cross-regional variation in wage
changes than the standard measures. Among the standard measures, proxies for
regional changes in import penetration (EMC) explain slightly more of the variation
in regional wage changes than employment weighted tariff changes (ETC).
3.3.4 Real wages
The empirical literature on the impact of trade on local labor markets focuses on
nominal wages instead of cost-of-living adjusted wages since price indices are usually
not observed at a disaggregated level, such as commuting zones or microregions. The
advantage of performing counterfactual exercises is that the change in microregion
price indices can be solved for and this allows to calculate real wage changes. In the
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model, a unilateral trade liberalization triggers both a reduction in nominal wages
and in price indices. Depending on which of these two variables decreases more, real
wages can increase or decrease.28
The formula for the real wage change in region i is given by: ŵRi = ŵi − P̂i,
where ŵi is the change in the nominal wage and P̂i is the change in the aggregate
price index in region i.29
Table 3.7 shows in the second row that price indices decrease in more than
90% of the regions as a consequence of more competition from trade liberalization.
Real wage changes range from a -0.26 log points decrease in the most affected region
to a 1 log point increase in the most benefited region. The median change is equal to
-0.034 log points. However, when weighting by the number of hours in each region,
the average real wage gain in Brazil after trade liberalization is 0.11 log points.
This fact indicates that bigger regions were on average more benefited by trade
liberalization. In multisector Krugman-like models it is possible for some regions
to lose from trade. This can be the case for regions with comparative disadvantage
in sectors with strong scale effects, as explained in Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2014).
The geographic distribution of real wage changes differs from that of nominal
wage changes. Figure 3.7 shows a map of each variable. A clear pattern emerges in
Panel B of regions located in the coast being more benefited by trade liberalization
and welfare gains becoming progressively negative as we move towards central re-
28Note that tariffs in agriculture increased (see Table 3.4), so it can be possible for wages and/or
price indices to actually increase in some regions.
29Details of the calculation of the change in price indices are in Appendix A.6.
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gions. By comparing Panels A and B, we can see that in some regions changes in
price indices overturned changes in nominal wages. This is the case for example of
some coastal regions in the South East that have nominal wage losses that are in
the top quintile of the country but experience real wage gains.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 are scatter plots by sector of the relationship between real
wage change measures. Although, none of the measures are meant to explain real
wages, it is interesting to analyze their correlation. ETC is negatively correlated
with real wage changes, for almost every sector. LTC is positively correlated with
real wage changes in some sectors and negatively correlated with them in others.
The fit of the regression is particularly good in Metals, Chemicals, Textiles, and
Food. Results for employment exposure measures are in line with findings in Monte
(2014) who finds a weak and negative correlation between an exposure measure like
ETC and real wage changes.
3.4 Estimating the wage elasticity with respect to market
access
The analysis of the counterfactual experiments in the previous section showed that
standard exposure measures are not as good explaining the variation of wage changes
as linkages-based measures of exposure, even in the absence of other shocks. One
caveat is that the previous section used model-generated counterfactual wages and
in the model, it is precisely the linkages measures that constitute the direct effect
of trade shocks on wages. In this section, I propose an estimation strategy that
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incorporates trade linkages in the analysis of the effects of trade on observed wages.
In addition, I show that exposure measures can be interpreted as an instrument
for the endogenous change in market access, which in the model drives nominal
wage changes. Finally, I compare the results of my approach with the results of an
exposure approach.
3.4.1 Exposure as an instrument for changes in market ac-
cess
I start by deriving the structural equation that relates wage changes to changes
in market access, a trade cost-weighted average of the surrounding regions’ real
demand. To derive this equation, sum demand (equation 2.3) across all destination
markets and use the pricing equation (2.7) and the optimal scale of the firm. 30 This
yields what Fujita et al. (1999) first called a wage equation that holds for each sector.
These are N zero profit conditions that determine the maximum wages region i can
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)σk−1 is region i’s market access
in sector k, a measure of real demand. Region i’s overall market access in industry k
30Set ckji = xkji/dkji in the demand for manufactures, equation (2.3), to capture that due to





is a sum of all of its destinations’ capacities to buy its goods appropriately weighted
by trade costs.31 Regions that are near high-income (high wjLj) or low-competition
(high P kj ) markets have higher market access and are able to pay higher wages, other
things equal.












β̂ki k = 1...K (3.14)
In the data, however, both market and wages vary across sectors. To be
consistent with the model in Section 4.2 and with the literature that estimates
the impact of trade on local labor markets, the left hand side cannot vary across
sectors. Therefore, we can start from an expression where the left-had side varies











β̂ki k = 1...K, (3.15)


























From equation 3.16 we can derive the following estimating equation
31Note that region i itself is also included in the category “region i’s destination markets”.
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i is an aggregate of changes in sectoral market access,
α1 is the elasticity of regional wages with respect to aggregate market access and
νi is an unobservable error term, that contains random factors that affect regional
wages and also includes unobserved changes in productivity, as equation 3.16 shows.
This equation constrains the elasticity of substitution σ to be equal across sectors,
so that α1 = 1/σ. Otherwise, each sectoral σk would be included in the formula for
M̂Ai and α1 would be constrained to be equal to 1.
There are two challenges to estimate α1. First, M̂Ai is not directly observed,
and second, the estimate of α1 is biased due to structural correlation between unob-
served changes in region-sector productivities, βki , and MAki . I describe how I deal
with both issues in the following paragraphs.
I obtain MAki for every region and sector from the following set of systems of












)1−σk = ∑hwhLkh (MAkh)−1 (κkhj)1−σk
k = 1...K (3.18)
These systems are the same ones used by Anderson and Yotov (2010) to es-
timate buyer’s and seller’s incidence using Canadian and U.S. data. With data on
wages, sectoral employment, elasticities of substitution, Cobb-Douglas shares and a
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parametrization of trade costs, each of the systems that can be solved independently,
up to a normalization, for a unique solution for MAki and P ki .
Totally differentiating the system in equation 3.19, it is possible to decompose






































The endogenous component of changes in region i’s market access include
the changes in market access, wages, and sectoral employment in all the Brazil-
ian microregions, including region i. The exogenous component includes changes
in trade costs from the ROW to Brazilian regions, κ̂kROW,BRA, and from Brazil-
ian region i to the ROW, κ̂kBRA,ROW , and changes in the price index of the ROW,
P̂ kROW . Consider a unilateral tariff reduction by Brazil. In this case, κ̂BRA,ROW = 0
but κ̂ROW,BRA 6= 0. Since tariffs are set at the country level, I denote them
without microregion subscripts: τ kBRA. Therefore, we can express the exogenous









This is exactly the formula for the direct effect in equation 2.14, which I denoted
by LTC in equation 3.4. This direct effect, only affects MAki through changes
in the price index, without the mediation of changes in other endogenous vari-
32I used that κkij ≡ dkijbkijτkij , and therefore κ̂kij ≡ d̂kij + b̂kij + τ̂kij
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τ̂ kBRA is an instrument for M̂A
k
i .














τ̂ kBRA, which can be used as an instrument
for M̂Ai .
Among the exogenous components in equation 3.19, some are observable–like
tariff changes–and some are not–like changes in border barriers other than tariffs.
Any measurement error in the changes of border effects, can contaminate the mea-
sure of market access. Therefore, for the estimation below, I focus on the elasticity











where DMAki stands for domestic market access. The change in this variable
can be aggregated to the region level using the formula: ̂DMAi = ∑k LkiLi ̂DMAki .
ELTCi is a valid instrument for changes in domestic market access ̂DMAi, by the
arguments presented above. In fact, Brazilian tariff changes can only affect regional
wages through changes in Brazilian (i.e. domestic) market access, assuming Brazil
is small enough for changes in its wages to not affect World prices.33 To control
for changes in foreign market access, I include in my preferred specifications the
distance to the nearest sea port and the distance to Sao Paulo, which is the largest
economic center in the country.
33The two other papers that, to my knowledge, estimate a wage equation in changes using
regional data, also focus on domestic market access (see Hanson (2005) and Bartelme (2014)).
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= 0 and is not testable.
This assumption is violated if tariff changes are correlated with sector-region pro-
ductivity changes, β̂ki . This would could occur if regions that expect to have a
negative productivity shock in a sector, lobby for smaller tariff reductions in that
sector to mitigate the negative effect shock. On the one hand, tariff policy is set
at the country level so it is unlikely that a single microregion can have such lobby
power. On the other hand, since sectors tend to be clustered in space and produc-
tivity shocks can be spatially correlated, it is possible that a group of microregions
colludes to obtain smaller tariff reductions. However, the tariff reduction process
that took place in Brazil in the early 1990s was arguably not driven by lobbies.
It has been argued by a number of authors that tariff cuts in Brazil were driven
more by the government as a way to reduce distortions and to deal with macroe-
conomic problems rather than by interest groups (Abreu (2004), Gonzaga et al.
(2006), Kovak (2013), and Kume et al. (2000)). In addition, the MERCOSUR com-
mon external tariff provided another exogenous force for tariff cuts. Furthermore,
as Kovak (2013) shows, the correlation between the pre-liberalization tariff levels
and changes in tariff is -0.90, which gives support to the hypothesis that one of the
main goals of the tariff cuts was a reduction in cross-sectoral variation. However,
there is still potential endogeneity if pre-liberalization tariff levels were set according
to productivity considerations. Gonzaga et al. (2006) argue that after 1974 tariff
and non-tariff barriers were increased to cope with the macroeconomic instability
caused by the oil shocks in the late 1970s and the debt crisis in the 1980s and not
to protect sectors in which Brazil had comparative disadvantage. The authors show
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evidence that tariff levels in 1988 had a weakly positive correlation with sectoral
skill intensity, but with considerable variance.34
Another potential threat to identification are aggregate shocks that occurred
during trade liberalization. During the 1990s Brazil suffered from large devaluations
and high inflation. A devaluation in the model is equivalent to a uniform tariff
increase across sectors. Since in the model a uniform tariff change only affects
wages indirectly through changes in market access, not considering exchange rate
shocks does not invalidate my instrument, but it can make it weaker. However,
inflation can affect wages directly though bargaining. The maintained identifying
assumption is that sectoral variation in tariffs is uncorrelated with sectoral variation
in inflation rates. This seems reasonable given that one the main goals of the tariff
cuts was a reduction in cross-sectoral variation. In the case of other aggregate shocks
that affect regional wages uniformly, their effect is captured by the intercept of the
wage equation.
A final concern is that wages had already adjusted–at least partially–before
1991 due in part to timing, since tariff changes started before 1991, and in part to
anticipatory behavior by economic agents. If this was the case, the fall in market
access between 1991 and 2000 would be less correlated with tariff changes than in a
34The evidence for Brazil contrasts with that of Colombia. Karacaovali (2011) finds that in
Colombia more productive sectors were more protected and that the sectors with higher produc-
tivity gains were liberalized less. However, the author acknowledges that Colombia may be a
special case among developing countries that unilaterally liberalized trade: “Although some au-
thors [...] acknowledge the potential for endogeneity, they argue that it may not be such an issue
in their studies given that the tariffs were reduced uniformly or proportionally across sectors. This
is not true for Colombia; the liberalization was not uniform.”.
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scenario with no anticipation. This would make my instrument weak. However, as I
show in the next section, the F-statistic of the first stage rejects the null hypothesis.
3.4.2 Estimation results
I estimate the following equation
d lnwi,91−00 = α0 + α1d lnDMAi,91−00 + νki (3.21)
where d lnwi,91−00 are observed log wage changes in region i between 1991 and










an aggregate of sector-region log changes in domestic market access.
Panel A of Table 3.13 reports the results of the estimation of equation 3.21 with
OLS. My preferred specification is the one in column (4) which includes state fixed
effects and controls for the regional share of employment in manufacturing as well as
for the log of the distance to Sao Paulo and to the nearest sea port. The elasticity of
wages with respect to market access is around 0.05 and is significant at the 1%. Since
this equation in estimated in first differences, it removes any locational advantages
or amenities that are constant across time. However, there remains a potential
source of endogeneity in the estimated OLS coefficient: changes in productivity.
As I explained in the previous section, there is a structural correlation between
productivity and market access that would induce a positive covariance between
changes in market access and omitted changes in productivity, creating a positive
bias in the estimated OLS coefficient. However, if productivity changes are strongly
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negatively spatially correlated, the covariance between domestic market access and
productivity can be negative.35












 τ̂ k91,95, (3.22)
where τ̂ k91,95 is the log change in the Brazilian tariff factor between 1991 and





, where tky are ad-valorem tariffs in sector k
in year y = 1991, 1995.
Panel B in Table 3.13, reports the results of estimating equation 3.21 with
2SLS using ELTC as an instrument for changes in domestic market access.36 The
elasticity of wages with respect to domestic market access in my preferred speci-
fication is around 0.12 and significant at the 1%. This value is greater than the
OLS estimate and suggests a negative covariance between unobserved changes in
productivity and changes in market access. The Hausman test of exogeneity, rejects
the null hypothesis at the 1% of significance. Compared to other estimates from the
literature, these values are similar to values obtained for Brazil and smaller than
values for the U.S. Fally et al. (2010) estimate a wage elasticity with respect to do-
mestic market access of 0.16 using cross-sectional data at the state-sector level for
Brazil in 1999. For the U.S., Hanson (2005) estimates a value of 0.5 using county-
35Bartelme (2014) provides a similar argument.
36Table 3.21 shows summary stats for regressions.
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level data for the period 1970-1990 and Bartelme (2014) estimates a value of 0.6
using data at the MSA level for the periods 1990-2000 and 2000-2007.37
Although ELTC is my preferred instrument since it is derived from the model,
I explore results using other exposure measures as instruments. This is useful for
two reasons. First, there might be cases where linkages between regions are not
observed and it is of interest to ask if an employment-weighted average of shocks,
like ETC, can be used as an instrument. In addition, there can be cases where
the shock itself is not observed and we may wonder if a measure using changes
in imports, like EMC, can be used as an instrument. Second, by including other
instruments, I can perform tests of overidentifying restrictions.
In Table 3.14 I use the other exposure measures as instruments. ETC and
LTC are constrained versions of the more general and theory consistent, ELTC.
In particular, ETC assumes no variation in linkages and elasticities of substitution,
and LTC assumes no variation in employment shares. EMC does not use infor-
mation in tariff changes and uses instead variation in sectoral import penetration
between 1991 and 2000. This measure would be more appropriate in cases where
the shock is not observable. All measures yield positive and significant estimates
that are greater than those estimated with OLS, which gives support to the hy-
pothesis that the OLS coefficient is biased downwards. EMC yields a negative and
non-significant coefficient. Comparing these estimates with the ones obtained using
the model-based measure ELTC, ETC gives similar values, of around 0.09, but
37Kumar (2007) estimates an elasticity of regional wages with respect to domestic market access
of around 0.4 for India.
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LTC gives much estimates for the elasticity, of around 0.3 and the precision in very
low when including controls. This means that discarding the variation in linkages
does not alter the estimate of the elasticity as much as discarding the information in
employment shares. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions of a specification
including ELTC and ETC as instruments cannot reject the null hypothesis, and
the same occurs with a specification including ELTC and EMC. However, this is
not the case for LTC, the Sargan test of a specification including ELTC and LTC
as instruments rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting LTC is not a valid instrument.
Table 3.15 shows the results from the first stage regression for all the instru-
mental variables. The instruments are highly correlated with market access and the
F-statistics are well above the rule of thumb value of 10. LTC is the only instrument
that is negatively related to changes in domestic market access. However, in the
second stage it provides the correct sign for the coefficients on market access. Intu-
itively, we would expect the instruments to be positively associated with changes in
market access. However, it is important to keep in mind that these variables give a
measure of a direct effect of changes in tariffs on changes in market access, and it is
possible that other effects overturn the sign of this relationship. In fact, I show this
is a possible scenario in the sector-by-sector analysis in Section 3.3.2.
Finally, Table 3.16 reports the results from the reduced form estimations.
These correspond to the type of specification in the exposure approach, where
changes in wages are a function of exposure. Both ELTC and ETC yield posi-
tive and significant coefficients. LTC has a negative coefficient, which can seem
counter-intuitive but, as I mentioned in the previous paragraph, measures of direct
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effects can be overturned by other effects. The coefficients for EMC, the measure
most similar to the one by Autor et al. (2013), are always negative, as expected, and
significant. The coefficients in Panel B, columns 1 and 2, can be compared to results
in Kovak (2013). He obtains a value of 0.4 when controlling for state fixed effects
while I obtain a much larger value of 1.2. The reason is that both my measure of
wages and my measure of exposure are different from his. As I mentioned in Section
3.2, I use average wages and he uses region fixed effects from a Mincer regression.
Also, my measure of exposure is different since I work at a more aggregated level: I
have 12 sectors whereas he has 19.38 In section 3.4.4 I compare my results with his.
3.4.3 Economic significance across different approaches
I showed how exposure can serve as instrument for changes in market access and I
estimated an elasticity of wages to domestic market access of 0.12. But, how does
this estimate compares with the reduced form estimates in Table 3.16?
There are two issues that complicate a straightforward comparison. First,
reduced form estimates are not designed to recover the elasticity of wages to market
access, so the values of the estimates cannot be directly compared across approaches.
In the empirical literature the reduced form estimates have been interpreted in
a difference-in-difference way as measuring how a relative increase in a region’s
exposure with respect to another region would change its wages. Second, there
is not an explicit function relating changes in tariffs to changes in market access.
38The interstate trade data I use to calibrate the model and predict trade shares forces me to
work at a higher level of aggregation. See Appendix B for details.
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Market access changes in a single region are a function of changes in endogenous
variables in all Brazilian regions. I tackle these issues in the following way. First,
I simulate the change in domestic market access using the system of equations in
equation 3.18 that would take place under the observed change in tariffs, holding
everything else constant. I call this variable, counterfactual domestic market access,
DMAC . To compare across approaches, I calculate the interquartile range change
in either exposure or market access and I obtain the estimated wage change by
multiplying it by the corresponding estimated coefficients I obtained in the previous
sections.
The results from this exercise are in Table 3.20. Panel A contains the re-
sults from increasing market access and exposure from the 25th to 75th percentile
and Panel B and C decompose this change into the change from the 25th to 50th
percentile and the change from the 50th to the 75th. Columns 1 and 2 show the
difference in the effect when I use observed changes in market access with counter-
factual ones. Since domestic market access could change due to a variety of factors,
the measureDMAC is a way of using the structure of the model to obtain the change
in market access that would result from a change of tariffs while keeping everything
else constant. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in this variable implies
a wage change of 0.62%. Note that trade liberalization decreased market access, so
this number should be interpreted as: an interquartile range decrease in domestic
market access, implies a decrease in wages of 0.62%. Columns 3 and 4 report that an
interquartile wage increase in exposure as measured by ELTC and ETC leads to a
change in wages of around 3%. Since exposure is a linear function of tariffs and tar-
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iffs decreased during the period, this result says that an interquartile range decrease
in weighted-tariff changes, leads to a 3% decrease in wages. The implied value for
EMC is similar except that the sign is the opposite since trade liberalization lead
to an increase in imports and EMC is a weighted average of imports.
Figure 3.10 shows wage changes predicted with a market access approach–by
using each regions’ DMAC and the estimated elasticity of 0.12–with those predicted
with employment exposure–by using each regions’ ETC and the estimated coefficient
of 0.71. Although some regions change quintiles depending on the approach, the
most affected regions are in the South East, surrounding the cities of Belo Horizonte,
Curitiba, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. These regions have a decrease in predicted
wages of between -0.7 and -3.3 log points using the market access approach (Panel A)
and a strictly more negative decrease of between -3.4 and -8.4 using the employment
exposure approach.
In conclusion, reduced form measures of exposure overstate the impact of tariff
changes on wages compared to an approach based on market access.
3.4.4 Robustness
In this section I deal with potential concerns about the previous estimates. First, I
re-estimate the wage equation using tariff changes between 1991 and 1998 instead
of using those between 1991 and 1995. As I explained in Section 3.2, the bulk
of tariff reductions occurred at the beginning of the decade but there was a small
reversal of trade reform between 1995 and 1998. Second, I re-calculate link-based
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instruments leaving out the elasticities of substitution. The main reason to do
this is consistency. Estimating a unique wage elasticity to market access requires
to constrain the elasticity of substitution to be equal across sectors. Third, I re-
run the reduced form regressions using Kovak (2013) measure of wages. This is
to check how much the estimated reduced form coefficient changes due to a higher
level of sectoral aggregation. Fourth, I address concerns about migration flows. If
workers arbitrage by moving to microregions experiencing higher market access, my
estimates of the wage elasticity should be interpreted as a lower bound. Finally, I
use a measure of domestic market access that does not consider own region wages,
to avoid any mechanical correlation between changes in domestic market access and
wage changes.
Panel A of Table 3.17 shows results are robust to considering tariff changes
between 1991 and 1998, the estimates of the wage elasticities using ELTC, ETC,
and LTC are similar to those obtained using changes between 1991 and 1995.
Panel B of Table 3.17 reports the wage elasticities using as instruments link-
based exposure measures that discard variation in the elasticities of substitution.
The estimates using ELTC, my preferred instrument, are still significant but lower
than in the baseline specification. The wage elasticity is 0.07 when including a full
set of controls.
Table 3.18 shows results using Kovak’s measure of regional wages. This mea-
sure corresponds to the change between 1991 and 2000 in the region fixed effect of
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a Mincer regression that controls for individual characteristics.39 Columns 1 and 2
in Panel B are directly comparable to his estimates. I estimate a coefficient of 0.58,
which is higher than the estimate of 0.4 that he obtains. This can be attributed
to both my higher level of sector aggregation and the fact that I use tariff changes
between 1991 and 1995 and he uses tariff changes between 1990 and 1995. However,
when including the full set of controls the coefficient is no longer significant.
I estimate the effect of market access on the in-migration rate of a microregion.
For this purpose I use a question in the Census questionnaire that asks workers the
municipality they lived in 5 years ago. The dependent variable is Migrantsji,95−00
Nativesi,95
where the numerator are the hours worked by workers living in microregion i in
2000 that report having live in microregion j 6= i in 1995 and the denominator are
the hours worked by workers that lived in microregion i both in 2000 and in 1995.
Table 3.19 shows that in most of the cases the estimates are not significant. Column
2 in Panel A shows that when using ELTC, my preferred instrument for market
access, the coefficient for the change in market access is negative and significant
at the 10%, but the coefficient is no longer significant when including the full set
of controls. These results suggest migration flows do not respond to changes in
domestic market access.
Finally, my results are unaltered when I exclude own-region wages from the
computation of domestic market access.40
39I weight the regression using the standard error of the fixed effects estimates as in Kovak
(2013).
40I do not show the results here for the sake of brevity.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter I took the theoretical model in Chapter 3 to the Brazilian data in
two ways. First, I calibrated the model in the initial year, 1991 and I performed
a set of counterfactual exercises. These exercises show employment-based exposure
measures are poor predictors of wage changes generated by the model while linkage-
based exposure measures explain more of the variation in counterfactual wages.
Second, I proposed an estimation strategy and an instrument based on the model.
I showed a linkage-based exposure measure can be interpreted as an instrument
for changes in domestic market access and I estimated an elasticity of wages with
respect to market access of 0.12. Using this elasticity I showed that reduced form
approaches overstate the impact of trade openness on wages.
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3.6 Tables
Tab. 3.1: Descriptive statistics of microregion level variables.
Variable mean s.d. min max
Area (km2) 17270.3 37377.7 18.4 423951.7
Distance to port (km) 318.3 305.5 5.9 1537.9
Distance to Sao Paulo (km) 1259.3 840.7 18.1 3348.5
Hourly wage (usd) 0.90 0.37 0.31 2.58
Hours worked (mill.) 179.6 526.7 1.5 8457.4
Full-time equivalent workers (thou.) 86.4 253.2 0.7 4066.0
Notes: Values corresponding to the 494 Brazilian microgregions in 1991. Distance to port
is the minimum distance of a microregion’s centroid to the nearest sea port. Distance to
Sao Paulo is the distance of a microregion’s centroid to the centroid of the microregion
containing the city of Sao Paulo. Microregions’ wages in current US dollars and hours
worked are calculated as described in Section 3.2. Full time equivalent workers are equal
to total hours divided by the number of hours worked in a year, assuming full-time workers
works 40 hours per week.
Sources: Areas: IBGE. Distances: own calculation using publicly available shape files from
IBGE. Wages and hours: Demographic Census, IBGE. See Appendix B for details.
Tab. 3.2: Descriptive statistics of ad-valorem tariffs.
year mean median s.d. min max N
1988 38.61 39.25 17.06 5.63 80.93 53
1989 31.54 28.89 17.73 1.88 77.33 53
1990 28.59 28.35 15.49 3.33 78.68 53
1991 22.77 20.75 13.46 1.67 63.65 53
1992 15.07 14.20 8.38 0.56 38.97 53
1993 13.01 12.50 6.26 2.14 33.97 52
1994 10.68 9.50 5.94 2.21 31.19 52
1995 11.90 10.74 6.64 1.48 41.00 53
Notes: Ad-valorem tariffs applied by Brazil at the 4-digit Na-
tional Accounts classification ("Nivel 80"). N corresponds to the
number of 4-digit products over which statistics were calculated
in each year.
Source: Kume et al. (2003). See Appendix B for details.
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Tab. 3.3: Gravity equation: 1999. PPML estimates.
Dependent variable: log bilateral exports
log dist s.e. obs.
dist
elasticity
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4)
Agric. -1.217*** 0.120 546 0.529
Mining -2.196*** 0.260 520 0.845
Mineral Manuf. -1.387*** 0.104 546 0.821
Metal, Mach., Elect. & Autom -0.410*** 0.078 546 0.193
Paper -1.051*** 0.127 546 0.688
Rubber & Plastic -0.857*** 0.117 546 0.371
Chemic., Pharm. & Petrol. -0.894*** 0.132 546 0.541
Textiles -0.498*** 0.101 520 0.234
Apparel -0.735*** 0.060 546 0.328
Footwear & Leather -0.345*** 0.089 494 0.025
Food -1.214*** 0.065 546 0.473
Wood & Others -0.621*** 0.085 546 0.308
Notes: Column 1 reports PPML estimates of the log distance coefficient in sector-level
gravity equations in 1999. Robust standard errors are reported in column 2. Standard
errors are clustered by pair of states. Column 4 reports δk, the implied elasticity of
trade costs with respect to distance. N=494. All specifications include an intercept.
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.4: Tariff levels and tariff changes by sector: 1991-1995 and 1991-1998
Sector 1991 1995 1998 (1+t95)(1+t91)
(1+t98)
(1+t91)
Agric. 5.100 7.400 9.900 1.022 1.046
Mining 3.202 1.237 2.828 0.981 0.996
Mineral Manuf. 19.600 10.200 13.600 0.921 0.950
Metal, Mach., Elect. & Autom 29.035 17.592 18.422 0.911 0.918
Paper 13.400 9.800 14.200 0.968 1.007
Rubber & Plastic 32.532 14.301 16.942 0.862 0.882
Chemic., Pharm. & Petrol. 16.270 5.936 10.316 0.911 0.949
Textiles 30.600 14.900 19.400 0.880 0.914
Apparel 48.300 19.800 22.800 0.808 0.828
Footwear & Leather 24.800 17.900 17.200 0.945 0.939
Food 27.217 12.595 15.983 0.885 0.912
Wood & Others 23.514 11.886 15.016 0.906 0.931
Notes: Ad-valorem tariffs applied by Brazil aggregated to 12 traded sectors as described in
Appendix B. The last two columns report the ratio of the tariff factors in 1995 and 1998 with
respect to the level in 1991.
Source: Kume et al. (2003)
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Tab. 3.5: Counterfactual wage change decomposition.
wage change decomposition DE + PE decomposition
Sector
wage
change DE PE SE PE+SE|DE| own
own
DE+PE
Agric. -0.0015 -0.0424 0.0047 0.0361 0.964 0.0020 -0.0533
Mining -0.0153 -0.4203 0.1128 0.2921 0.964 -0.0264 0.0859
Mineral Manuf. -0.0002 -0.0608 0.0135 0.0472 0.997 -0.0056 0.1181
Metal, Mach., Elect. & Autom -0.0127 -0.4898 0.0600 0.4171 0.974 -0.0121 0.0282
Paper -0.0012 -0.1175 0.0240 0.0923 0.990 -0.0105 0.1125
Rubber & Plastic -0.0012 -0.2839 0.0458 0.2369 0.996 -0.0270 0.1132
Chemic., Pharm. & Petrol. -0.0057 -0.4535 0.0958 0.3520 0.987 -0.0329 0.0919
Textiles -0.0018 -0.1995 0.0150 0.1827 0.991 -0.0085 0.0463
Apparel -0.0002 -0.0301 0.0027 0.0272 0.995 -0.0028 0.1028
Footwear & Leather -0.0203 -1.3741 0.3600 0.9937 0.985 0.2328 -0.2296
Food -0.0169 -0.2196 0.0602 0.1425 0.923 0.0166 -0.1044
Wood & Others -0.0035 -0.2465 0.0209 0.2221 0.986 -0.0094 0.0416
Notes: decomposition of the counterfactual wage change due to 1% shock in the trade cost of importing goods from
ROW in each sector. Wage changes in log points. DE, PE, SE, and own correpond to the direct, partial, spillover,
and own-region effects defined in Section 2.3.
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Tab. 3.6: R-squared decomposition from synthetic OLS regressions. 1% shock in each
sector.
Dependent variable: log counterfactual wage change
Model 1. Linear Model 2. Polynomial
1% shock to sector: R2 ETC LTC R2 ETC LTC
Agric. 0.200 0.553 0.447 0.235 0.515 0.485
Mining 0.002 0.052 0.948 0.208 0.092 0.908
Mineral Manuf. 0.179 0.004 0.996 0.280 0.147 0.853
Metal, Mach., Elect. & Autom 0.366 0.162 0.838 0.625 0.095 0.905
Paper 0.403 0.196 0.804 0.442 0.251 0.749
Rubber & Plastic 0.518 0.026 0.974 0.536 0.046 0.954
Chemic., Pharm. & Petrol. 0.056 0.863 0.137 0.290 0.191 0.809
Textiles 0.480 0.255 0.745 0.488 0.301 0.699
Apparel 0.645 0.077 0.923 0.731 0.201 0.799
Footwear & Leather 0.855 0.001 0.999 0.918 0.007 0.993
Food 0.542 0.017 0.983 0.689 0.011 0.989
Wood & Others 0.444 0.030 0.970 0.469 0.049 0.951
Notes: Resuls from a 1% decrease in the trade cost of importing from the ROW in each sector.
Shapley decomposition of the R-squared of a synthetic regression of counterfactual log wage changes
on: exposure measures ETC and LTC (Panel I) and 3rd-degree polynomial of exposure measures
(Panel II). Column 1 in each panel reports the R-squared and the three following columns report
the share of the R-squared explained by each variable (Panel I) or group of variables (Panel II).
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Tab. 3.7: Distribution of counterfactual wage changes and price index changes. Trade
liberalization.
Variable min p5 p25 p50 p75 p90 max mean
wgt.
mean
ŵ -0.386 -0.313 -0.272 -0.255 -0.228 -0.119 -0.002 -0.242 -0.256
P̂ -0.997 -0.646 -0.435 -0.245 -0.153 -0.009 0.034 -0.294 -0.362
ŵ − P̂ -0.262 -0.214 -0.108 -0.034 0.187 0.477 0.995 0.052 0.106
Notes: values correspond to the trade liberalization counterfactual. Wage changes, ŵ, price index changes, P̂ , and real wage
changes ŵ− P̂ in log points. Weighted mean value corresponds to the average of each variable weighted by the total number
of hours worked in the microregion.
Tab. 3.8: Correlation coefficient between exposure measures
ETC EMC LTC ELTC
ETC 1
EMC -0.506 1
LTC 0.224 -0.252 1
ELTC 0.862 -0.521 0.253 1
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Tab. 3.9: Standard exposure measures and change in counterfactual wages in Brazilian
microregions. Trade liberalization. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: log counterfactual wage change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ETC 0.354*** -0.0195 0.375 -0.266





EMC -0.00117*** -1.44e-05 -0.00124*** 5.78e-05





R-squared 0.031 0.396 0.032 0.406 0.067 0.396 0.085 0.398
State FE X X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors clustered by state. The
dependent variable is the counterfactual wage change resulting from trade liberalization. N=494. All specifications include an
intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.10: Linkages-based exposure measures and change in counterfactual wages in
Brazilian microregions. Trade liberalization. OLS estimates.
Dependent variable: log counterfactual wage change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LTC 0.457*** 0.310*** -2.807*** -1.709***





ELTC 2.322*** 0.909*** 2.656** 0.729





R-squared 0.256 0.479 0.315 0.496 0.114 0.407 0.120 0.409
State FE X X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors clustered by state.
The dependent variable is the counterfactual wage change resulting from trade liberalization. N=494. All specifications
include an intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.11: Exposure measures and change in counterfactual wages in Brazilian microre-
gions. Trade liberalization. OLS estimates.












Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below
coefficient estimates. Standard errors clustered by state. The
dependent variable is the counterfactual wage change resulting
from trade liberalization. N=494. All specifications include an
intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.12: R-squared decomposition from synthetic OLS regressions. Trade liberaliza-
tion.
Dependent variable: log counterfactual wage change
share of R2explained by:
R2 ETC EMC LTC ELTC
Panel A. Linear
0.359 0.099 0.072 0.581 0.248
Panel B. Polynomial
0.498 0.182 0.071 0.484 0.262
Notes: Shapley decomposition of the R-squared of a synthetic regres-
sion of counterfactual log wage changes on: exposure measures ETC,
EMC, and LTC (Panel A) and 3rd-degree polynomial of exposure
measures (Panel B). Column 1 in each panel reports the R-squared
and the three following columns report the share of the R-squared
explained by each variable (Panel A) or group of variables (Panel B).
Regressions do not include state fixed effects.
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Tab. 3.13: Changes in market access and changes in wages in Brazilian microregions.
OLS and 2SLS estimates. 1991-2000
Dependent variable: d lnwage91−00
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. OLS
d lnDMA91−00 0.0886*** 0.0779*** 0.0625*** 0.0458***
(0.0230) (0.0142) (0.0203) (0.0153)
R-squared 0.055 0.329 0.079 0.365
Panel B. 2SLS ( IV: ELTC)
d lnDMA91−00 0.173*** 0.166*** 0.138** 0.118***
(0.0620) (0.0363) (0.0572) (0.0447)
R-squared 0.006 0.288 0.051 0.343
Controls X X
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient esti-
mates. Standard errors clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include an
intercept. Controls: share of hours worked in manufacturing in 1991, log distance
to Sao Paulo, and log distance to the nearest sea port. Significant at *10%, **5%,
***1%.
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Tab. 3.14: Changes in market access and changes in wages in Brazilian microregions.
Other IVs. 2SLS estimates. 1991-2000
Dependent variable: d lnwage91−00
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 2SLS ( IV: ETC)
d lnDMA91−00 0.154*** 0.168*** 0.102** 0.0868**
(0.0437) (0.0322) (0.0467) (0.0370)
R-squared 0.025 0.287 0.071 0.358
Panel B. 2SLS ( IV: LTC)
d lnDMA91−00 0.287*** 0.335*** 12.12 -2.107
(0.0750) (0.0888) (65.55) (21.80)
R-squared
Panel C. 2SLS ( IV: EMC)
d lnDMA91−00 0.142*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.0642***
(0.0337) (0.0156) (0.0317) (0.0202)
R-squared 0.035 0.320 0.065 0.364
Controls X X
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard
errors clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include an intercept. Controls: share of
hours worked in manufacturing in 1991, log distance to Sao Paulo, and log distance to the
nearest sea port. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.15: Changes in market access and changes in wages in Brazilian microregions.
First stage estimates. 1991-2000
Dependent variable: d lnDMA91−00
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. ELTC
ELTC 26.28*** 23.24*** 28.24** 26.58**
(4.211) (5.755) (10.53) (12.05)
R-squared 0.375 0.456 0.470 0.517
F-stat 38.96 16.30 71.59 155.4
Panel B. ETC
ETC 7.842*** 7.047*** 8.532*** 8.230***
(0.784) (0.904) (0.917) (1.086)
R-squared 0.396 0.481 0.465 0.518
F-stat 99.98 60.75 120.9 63.09
Panel C. LTC
LTC -3.239*** -2.496*** -0.125 0.136
(0.839) (0.797) (0.706) (1.309)
R-squared 0.105 0.313 0.322 0.408
F-stat 14.89 9.800 23.72 30.91
Panel D. EMC
EMC -0.792*** -0.769*** -0.832*** -0.851***
(0.0481) (0.0474) (0.0462) (0.0548)
R-squared 0.594 0.646 0.622 0.664
F-stat 270.7 263.2 104.8 129.3
Controls X X
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient esti-
mates. Standard errors clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include an
intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.16: Exposure measures and changes in wages in Brazilian microregions. OLS
(reduced form) estimates. 1991-2000
Dependent variable: d lnwage91−00
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. ELTC
ELTC 4.536*** 3.869*** 3.908*** 3.135***
(1.125) (0.675) (1.001) (0.637)
R-squared 0.079 0.334 0.080 0.367
Panel B. ETC
ETC 1.205*** 1.181*** 0.870** 0.715**
(0.388) (0.225) (0.392) (0.291)
R-squared 0.066 0.340 0.071 0.362
Panel C. LTC
LTC -0.928*** -0.836*** -1.512*** -0.286
(0.181) (0.181) (0.384) (0.504)
R-squared 0.061 0.335 0.127 0.357
Panel D. EMC
EMC -0.112*** -0.0903*** -0.0958*** -0.0547***
(0.0242) (0.0139) (0.0279) (0.0171)
R-squared 0.084 0.334 0.088 0.364
Controls X X
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient esti-
mates. Standard errors clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include
an intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.17: Changes in market access and changes in wages in Brazilian microregions.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Tab. 3.18: Changes in market access and changes in wages in Brazilian microregions.
Robustness checks. OLS estimates. 1991-2000
Dependent variable: Kovak’s log wage change 1991-2000
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. ELTC
ELTC 3.321* 2.403*** -0.104 0.856
(1.775) (0.529) (1.213) (0.504)
R-squared 0.106 0.733 0.185 0.745
Panel B. ETC
ETC 0.589 0.583*** -0.658 -0.0621
(0.646) (0.200) (0.507) (0.224)
R-squared 0.037 0.725 0.200 0.744
Panel C. LTC
LTC 0.0620 -0.316*** 0.197 -0.191
(0.440) (0.107) (0.392) (0.406)
R-squared 0.000 0.709 0.187 0.744
Panel D. EMC
EMC -0.0689* -0.0505*** -0.0399 -0.0256
(0.0336) (0.00595) (0.0322) (0.0207)
R-squared 0.122 0.738 0.197 0.747
Controls X X
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coef-
ficient estimates. Standard errors clustered by state. N=494. All
specifications include an intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.19: Changes in market access and in-migration rates in Brazilian microregions.
Robustness checks. 2SLS estimates.
Dependent variable: in-migration rate in 2000
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. IV: ELTC
d lnDMA91−00 -0.00214 -0.0139* 0.00101 0.00841
(0.0128) (0.00770) (0.00862) (0.00583)
R-squared 0.299 0.668 0.726
Panel B. IV: ETC
d lnDMA91−00 -0.00556 -0.0212 -0.00566 0.00606
(0.0157) (0.0132) (0.00836) (0.00926)
R-squared 0.296 0.669 0.727
Panel C. IV: LTC
d lnDMA91−00 0.0515 0.0176 -0.0295 -0.593
(0.0363) (0.0315) (0.337) (4.832)
R-squared 0.286 0.656
Panel D. IV:EMC
d lnDMA91−00 -0.00186 -0.0121 -0.00590 0.00643*
(0.0141) (0.00808) (0.00636) (0.00371)
R-squared 0.300 0.669 0.727
Controls X X
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient es-
timates. Standard errors clustered by state. N=494. Controls: in-migration
rate in 1991 and the same set of controls as in previous tables. Significant at
*10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 3.20: Estimated wage change implied by an interquartile range change in market
access and exposure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DMA DMAC ELTC ETC EMC
Panel A. 25th to 75th percentile
∆var 0.39 0.052 0.0094 0.042 0.29
coeff 0.12 0.12 3.2 0.71 -0.085
wage change (%) 4.71 0.62 3.01 2.97 -2.45
Panel B. 25th to 50th percentile
∆var 0.087 0.034 0.0061 0.028 0.25
coeff 0.12 0.12 3.2 0.71 -0.085
wage change (%) 1.04 0.41 1.95 1.98 -2.13
Panel C. 50th to 75th percentile
∆var 0.20 0.018 0.0033 0.014 0.14
coeff 0.12 0.12 3.2 0.71 -0.085
wage change (%) 2.42 0.21 1.06 0.99 -1.20
Notes: DMAC is the increase in domestic counterfactual market access as de-
scribed in the text. ∆var is the change in the variable in eitherDMA,DMAC ,
ELTC,ETC,or EMC in the specified percentile range. Coeff is the estimated
coefficient for that variable in the preferred specification. The wage change is
equal to the change in the variable times the estimated coefficient.
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Tab. 3.21: Descriptive statistics of variables in wage regressions
mean s.d. min max
1991
lnwage -0.1857 0.4147 -1.1838 0.9476
DMA -11.3903 1.6442 -20.5610 -6.9890
In-migration rate 0.1135 0.1106 0.0108 1.5371
2000
lnwage 0.2689 0.3604 -0.7402 1.2940
DMA -12.6065 1.2998 -19.2831 -7.9309
In-migration rate 0.0968 0.0677 0.0196 0.7342
Changes 1991-2000
d lnwage91−00 0.4546 0.1406 -0.0223 0.9794
d lnDMA91−00 -1.4205 0.3735 -2.9435 -0.4070
Exposure in 1991
ELTC -0.0092 0.0087 -0.0773 0.0010
ETC -0.0233 0.0300 -0.1172 0.0216
LTC -0.3422 0.0374 -0.4026 -0.1593
EMC 0.338 0.363 0.045 2.090
Notes: N=494. Wages are in current US dollars. The i-migration rate cor-
responds to the ratio of hours worked by workers living in microregion i in t
that report having live in microregion in t − 5 and hours worked by workers
that lived in microregion i both in t and in in t− 5
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3.7 Figures











































































25th pctile 75th pctile
Notes: Share of hours worked in the 10 manufacturing sectors at the 25th percentile and at the 75th percentile of
each sector’s distribution across Brazilian microregions.
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Notes: Ad-valorem tariffs applied by Brazil aggregated to 12 traded sectors as described in Appendix B. Source:
Kume et al. (2003)
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Fig. 3.3: ETC exposure measure and change in counterfactual wages in Brazilian mi-
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Notes: counterfactual wage changes in log points due to a 1% reduction in the import cost from ROW in each
sector. Top and bottom percentile of each variable are trimmed. Fitted OLS regression line in red.
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Fig. 3.4: LTC exposure measure and change in counterfactual wages in Brazilian mi-
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Notes: counterfactual wage changes in log points due to a 1% reduction in the import cost from ROW in each
sector. Top and bottom percentile of each variable are trimmed. Fitted OLS regression line in red.
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Fig. 3.5: ETC exposure measure and change in counterfactual real wages in Brazilian
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Notes: counterfactual wage changes in log points due to a 1% reduction in the import cost from ROW in each
sector. Top and bottom percentile of each variable are trimmed. Fitted OLS regression line in red.
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Fig. 3.6: LTC exposure measure and change in counterfactual real wages in Brazilian
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Notes: counterfactual wage changes in log points due to a 1% reduction in the import cost from ROW in each
sector. Top and bottom percentile of each variable are trimmed. Fitted OLS regression line in red.
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Fig. 3.7: Counterfactual wage changes in Brazilian microregions resulting from trade
liberalization.
































Notes: quintiles of counterfactual nominal (Panel A) and real wage changes (Panel B). Wage changes are expressed
in log points. 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit the 26 states and the federal district.
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Notes: quintiles of the four exposure measures. 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit the 26 states and the federal
district.
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Fig. 3.9: Observed nominal wage changes and market access changes in Brazilian mi-
croregions 1991-2000
































Notes: quintiles of observed nominal wage changes (in current US dollars). Wage changes are expressed in log
points. 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit the 26 states and the federal district.
112
Fig. 3.10: Predicted wage changes and market access changes in Brazilian microregions
1991-2000
































Notes: quintiles of predicted log wage changes. Panel A uses counterfactual market access and the elasticity of
wages with respect to market access that is estimated using the IV approach. Panel B uses a regression of wage
changes on employment exposure. Wage changes are expressed in log points. 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit
the 26 states and the federal district.
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Chapter 4: Market access and the skill premium
in Brazil
4.1 Introduction
The influence of geographic location on wages–or more generally, on incomes–is a
feature shared by several trade models. Regions with better access to markets, save
more on transport costs and are able to pay higher wages. However, the influence of
location on relative wages is much less studied. In section 4.2 I extend the model
in Chapter 2 to incorporate two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. In section
4.3 I show descriptive evidence on the skill premium in Brazil and in section 4.4
I propose an estimation strategy. I find regions where domestic market access fell
more, experienced a lower decrease in the skill premium. I propose an explanation




I extend the model in Chapter 2, which considered homogeneous workers, to in-
corporate two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. When taking the model to
the data I consider high school graduates as skilled and high school dropouts as
unskilled.1
The environment is the same as in Chapter 2, unless otherwise noted. Each
region i has a fixed endowment of skilled and unskilled workers given, respectively, by
Si and Ui. For simplicity, I assume that even though there are two types of workers,
there is a representative consumer that has the same preferences as in Chapter 2.
This allows me to keep track of only price index for each region throughout the
analysis. The main difference in this new setup is the production function in traded
sectors, which in this version employs two factors. This alters the pricing equation
and consequently, the wage equation.
Traded sectors As in Chapter 2, traded goods are produced using an increasing
returns to scale technology and are subject to classic iceberg trade costs that are
composed of shipping costs, Brazilian tariffs, and other trade barriers. The market
structure is characterized by monopolistic competition: each firm in each sector k
faces a downward sloping demand curve with perceived price elasticity equal to σk,
the elasticity of substitution in the consumption of varieties of the good.
1See Section 4.3 for details.
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With two types of workers, the cost function of an individual traded good
producer in region i and in sector k is given by






F + qki /βki
)
(4.1)
The profit maximization problem faced by the producer of any variety of the























where qkij is the volume of sales to region j.
As in the one-factor version of the model, the optimal pricing rule is a constant











the difference with the one factor version is that with two factors prices depend








Free entry pins down the scale of each firm which is, as in the one-factor
version, equal to: qki = (σk − 1)F kβki .
Finally, aggregate demand for each type of worker in each traded sector is equal
to the number of firms in each sector, nki times the labor demand of an individual
firm, ski and uki ,
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Ski = nki ski (4.4)
Uki = nki uki . (4.5)
Traded sectors equilibrium The traded goods market equilibrium conditions
in region i are given by:
wSi S
k
i + wUi Uki =
∑
j
πkijµk(wSj Sj + wUj Uj) (4.6)
where the left hand side is the total wage bill paid by sector k to both skilled
and unskilled workers which, by free entry, should equal the right hand side given
by total revenues summed across all markets j.
Market access, wages, and the skill premium A great part of the empirical
literature is concerned with the role of spatial frictions in determining regional wages
or incomes. Intuitively, a region that is more isolated spends a higher proportion of
its income on transport costs and this imposes a penalty on wages. In a world with
more than one factor of production although remoteness imposes a penalty on total
income, its effect on relative factor rewards depends on the relative skill intensities
across different sectors.
As in the one-factor case, to derive a relationship between wages and market
access, sum demand across all destination markets and use the pricing equation
(4.3) and the optimal scale of the firm to obtain
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(wSi )αk(wUi )1−αk = ζki (MAki )
1
σk all k (4.7)
where ζkj ≡
[
















)σk−1 is market access. In relative changes, this
equation is given by
αkŵ
S





i all k (4.8)
Comparing equation 4.7 to the wage equation derived in Chapter 2 (equation
3.14), we see it no longer determines the regional average wage but it determines the
price of the composite labor input. Equation 4.7 implies that regions with higher
market access are able to afford paying higher wages to both skill and unskilled
workers. However, this equation is silent about relative factor rewards, wSi /wUi .
Suppose there is a constant returns to scale non-traded sector, as in Chapter 2.
I add two assumptions to those in Chapter 2. First, I assume the non-traded sector
is relatively skilled-intensive compared to traded sectors and second, I allow for
exogenous trade deficits. If market access decreases, wages of skilled and unskilled
workers decrease proportionally but keeping relative wages constant. If we allow for
trade deficits, aggregate expenditures do not decrease proportionally to the decrease
in wages, triggering an increase in the output of the non-traded sector.2 If the non-
traded sector is skilled-intensive relative to traded sectors, it absorbs relatively more
skilled workers than the traded sector releases, and therefore, for labor markets to
2See Appendix A.7 for a proof.
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clear, the relative wage of the skilled has to increase.3,4 This resembles a Stolper-
Samuelson effect: an increase in market access -and a consequent increase in the
relative price of the traded good- benefits the factor used relatively more intensively
in the traded sector.5
In the following analysis I use the trade liberalization shock in Brazil as an ex-
ogenous source of variation in market access to estimate how relative wages respond
to changes in market access and I check if the assumption that the non-traded sector
is skilled-intensive holds in the data.
4.3 Descriptive evidence
The data sources and variable definitions used in this Chapter are the same as in
Chapter 2, except otherwise noted.6
I define a worker as skilled if she is a High School Graduate, which in Brazil is
equivalent to 11 years of education and as unskilled if she is a High School Dropout.
Figure 4.1 shows the share of workers by educational attainment in both census
years. High School Dropouts represent 76% of the population in 1991 and 67% in
3If there are no trade deficits, the output of the non-traded sector is pinned down by the mag-
nitude of the relative wage between skilled and unskilled, as I show in equation A.12 in Appendix
A.7. Therefore, in equilibrium, an increase in market access increases skilled and unskilled wages
in the same proportion, ŵSi = ŵUi = M̂A
k
i , leaving the skill premium unchanged.
4Redding and Schott (2003) assume there is a residual freely-traded sector that is unskilled-
intensive in production. This implies skilled and unskilled wages have to change in opposite
directions. As I show in Appendix A.7, increases in market access would lead to an increase in the
wage of the skilled and a decrease in the wage of the unskilled.
5However, there is no “magnification effect”. This is, skilled wages do not decline, they just
grow less than unskilled wages. Francois and Nelson (1998) show in a 2x2 Hecksher-Ohlin model
that introducing non-homogeneous goods breaks down the classical “magnification effect”.
6A complete description of sources and definitions can be found in Section 3.2 and in Appendix
B.
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2000 and High School Graduates represent 24% of the population in 1991 and 33%
in 2000. The proportion of workers with at least some college education is low: 9%
in 1991 and 11% in 2000. To minimize the problem of having microregions with
a small number skilled workers, my definition of a skilled worker is a High School
Graduate instead of a worker with Some College.
The new variables I include in this section for each Brazilian microregion i
are: skilled and unskilled wages, wSi and wUi , total hours worked by the skilled and
the unskilled, Si and Li, and hours worked by sector, Ski and Lki . These variables
come form the Population Censuses of 1991 and 2000 and I calculate them as follows.
First, I defined and individual worker as skilled if she has completed at least 11 years
of education, and as unskilled otherwise. Second, I assign individuals to microregions
and I obtain Ski and Lki as the sum of yearly hours worked across skilled and unskilled
workers in region i and sector k and wSi and wUi , as the average hourly wage across
each type of worker in region i. Finally, for each region I obtain the skill premium,
this is the log of the relative wage of the skilled and the unskilled.
Table 4.6 shows the wages of the skilled and the unskilled have substantial
dispersion across regions both in 1991 and in 2000. Panel A shows unskilled workers
have in 1991 wages that range from 0.3 dollars per hour (usd/h) to 1.6 usd/h in
1991 with an average of 0.7 usd/h. Skilled workers have substantially higher wages
ranging from from 0.5 usd/h to 4.6 usd/h with an average of 1.9 usd/h. Variation
in skilled and unskilled wages across regions is not surprising given the results in
Chapter 2: market access varies substantially across regions and is an important
determinant of wages. What is surprising is that relative wages vary considerably
120
across regions. The first row of the table shows the skill premium in 1991 had an
average value of 102 log points. This is, skilled workers have wages in the average
microregion more than twice as high as unskilled workers. However, the values
range from 33 log points in the microregion with the lowest skill premium to 214 log
points in the region with the highest skill premium. The maps in Figure 4.2 shows
that the skill premium tends to be higher in the South East and North East regions
and lower in the more remote West and Central regions. Considering unskilled and
skilled wages separately, figures 4.3 and 4.4 show that both skilled and unskilled
wages tend to be lower in the North East region.
In terms of changes, Panel C of Table 4.6 shows that both skilled and unskilled
wages increased on average between 1991 and 2000. However, the average skill
premium decreased by 8.5 log points. This evidence is consistent with Gonzaga et al.
(2006), who find a decrease in the skill premium during this decade using household
survey data. Figure 4.5 shows the skill premium decreased in most regions, especially
in the North West and South East regions. The regions where the skill premium
increased are mostly concentrated in the Central and North East regions. Figure
4.6 shows that skilled and unskilled wages did not change in the same proportion
across regions.
To shed light into the determinants of changes in the regional skill premium,
in the next section I estimate the impact of changes in market access on the skill
premium and on skilled and unskilled wages using the trade liberalization episode




Based on equation 4.8 I estimate the following
d ln Yi,91−00 = β0 + β1d lnDMAi,91−00 + νki (4.9)
where Yi,91−00 is the change in the outcome of interest in region i between 1991
and 2000 and d lnDMAi,91−00 is the change in domestic market access as defined
in Chapter 2 equation 3.20. The outcome of interest can be the change in the skill
premium, ŜP i ≡ d ln(wSi /wUi ), the change in skilled wages, ŵSi , or the change in
unskilled wages, ŵUi .
As I explained in Chapter 2 Section 3.4, changes in domestic market access












 τ̂ k91,95, (4.10)
where Li is equal to total hours worked in a region, including both skilled and
unskilled hours.
4.4.2 Results
Table 4.1 shows the estimation of equation 4.9. The OLS estimates in Panel I are
insignificant. However, they become negative and significant when I use ELTC as
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an instrument and I control for state fixed effects. This is my preferred specification
for three reasons. First, by being in first differences it eliminates any locational
advantage that is constant in time. Second, by using ELTC as an instrument
it eliminates any bias coming from unobserved changes in regional productivity.
Third, by controlling for state fixed effects it controls for any variation in policies
that vary across states and that affect wages. This specification suggests a strong
and negative effect of increases in domestic market access in regional wage inequality.
A doubling of domestic market access reduces the skill premium by 13.4 log points.
For the average region this implies a reduction from 102 log points to 88.6 log points.
One caveat when interpreting this results is that changes in market access are not
exogenous. A given shock to trade costs increases market access differently in each
region.
To understand the source of the negative elasticity of the skill premium to
market access, I estimate the impact of changes in market access on skilled and
unskilled wages separately. Table 4.2 shows the results. My preferred specification,
in column (4), shows that the unskilled are more affected by changes in market access
than the skilled.7 So, a doubling of domestic market access increases the wages of
the unskilled by 21 log points (Panel B) while increasing the wages of the skilled by
7.5 log points, which results in a decrease of the skill premium. Columns 1 to 3 show
similar elasticities for skilled and unskilled workers and this is why in Table 4.1, the
effect of changes of market access on the skill premium is insignificant. The difference
7The null hypothesis that the elasticities are the same for both specification is rejected at a
1% level of confidence.
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between the OLS estimate the 2SLS estimate is much larger for the unskilled. This
means that unobserved factors that affected the wages of the unskilled between 1991
and 2000 were strongly negatively correlated with changes in domestic market access
during the same period.
As I explained in section 3.4.3, market access does not change in proportion to
tariffs. Therefore, to evaluate the economic significance of the estimates, I simulate
the change in domestic access that results from a change in tariffs as the one observed
between 1991 and 1999. A change from the 75th to the 25th percentile in the
distribution of the change in DMA implied by the tariff shock, yields an increase in
the skill premium of 0.7 log points. Since the skill premium decreased on average
in Brazil during the 1990s, this result means that regions where domestic market
access fell more as a result of trade liberalization, experienced a smaller decline in
the skill premium.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show estimation results for the skilled premium and skilled
and unskilled wages using the other three instrumental variables proposed in Chapter
2. Panel I of Table 4.3 reports that using ETC, the standard employment-weighted
tariff change, yields a negative skill premium elasticity with respect to market access
changes that is of a similar magnitude to the one I obtained using my preferred
instrument, ELTC. The other two instruments: EMC and LTC do not yield
significant estimates for this elasticity. Panel A of Table 4.4 shows that none of
the instruments yields a significant elasticity estimate for the skilled while Panel
B shows that the elasticity of unskilled wages with respect to domestic market
access is positive and significant with values that range from 0.2 to 0.36. Therefore,
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considering other instruments does not alter the baseline result that an increase in
market access reduces the skill premium in Brazil.8
Finally, Table 4.5 reports the results from the reduced form regressions. These
regressions resemble the ones estimated in the exposure approach. The dependent
variable is the outcome of interest and it is regressed on the different measures of
exposure. Note that more exposure to a decrease in tariffs as measured by ETC
and ELTC yields an increase in the skill premium and a decrease in unskilled wages
more pronounced that the decrease in skilled wages.9 This is consistent with the
market access results in the previous paragraphs: a decrease in tariffs decreases
market access leading to an increase in the skill premium through a decrease in the
wages of the unskilled higher than the decrease in the wages of the skilled.
Comparing these results with the literature, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2014)
find a small but negative effect of trade liberalization on the skill premium, which
is opposite to my findings. There are two main differences between their empirical
approach and mine. First, they measure the regional skill premium by estimat-
ing returns to education that vary across regions, and predicting wage gaps using
national-level returns to other worker characteristics. With this methodology they
find that the aggregate skill premium increased in Brazil, which is opposite to the
findings in Gonzaga et al. (2006) who find a decrease in the national skill premium
during the same period using Household Survey data. Second, their measure of
exposure weights by the difference in the share of skilled and unskilled workers em-
8The first stages estimates are the same as the ones reported in Table 3.15.
9Since tariff changes were negative, a decrease in weighted tariffs implies an increase in the
skill premium and a decrease in skilled wages.
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ployed in each sector while my instrument does not. The reason is that their measure
is derived from a specific factors model with no trade costs and homogeneous goods.
I employ a market access approach which differs fundamentally to their approach
by taking into account trade linkages between regions.
4.4.3 Mechanism
The results in the previous section are consistent with the findings in Chapter 2:
a decrease in market access leads to a decrease in the wages of both skilled and
unskilled workers. However, the wages of the unskilled decrease more. Why is this
the case?
One possible explanation for the positive elasticity of the skill premium with
respect to market access is that the non-traded sector is skilled-intensive. Trade lib-
eralization in Brazil generated a decrease in domestic market access and a shrinkage
of the manufacturing sector relative to the non-traded sector. If the non-traded
sector is skilled-intensive relative to manufacturing, the relative wage of the skilled
must increase. For this to be a possible mechanism, the evidence must show two
things: that it is indeed the case that the non-traded sector is skilled-intensive rel-
ative to manufacturing and that the non-traded sector increased in size after trade
liberalization.
I measure the skill intensity of a sector k in two alternative ways. The first






This measure implies that sector k is relatively more skilled-intensive than
sector s if the share of total hours worked by skilled workers is higher than in sector
s.
The second measure is a wage bill-based measure, SIWk , given by
SIWk =
wSkSk
wSkSk + wUk Uk
. (4.12)
This measure implies that sector k is relatively more skilled-intensive than
sector s if the share of the total sector’s wage bill paid to skilled workers is higher
than in sector s.
Figure 4.7 shows the skill intensity by sector in 1991 measured in these two
ways. The non-traded sector has a skill intensity of 0.28 as measured in hours and
of 0.55 as measured in terms of the wage bill. Using the hours-based measure, there
are only two individual sectors that are more skilled-intensive than the non-traded
sector: Chemicals, with a skill intensity of 0.29 and Paper, with a skill intensity of
0.31. Using the wage bill measure, only Chemicals is more skilled-intensive than
non-traded, with an intensity of 0.63. Since the trade liberalization shock affected
the whole manufacturing sector at the same time, the relevant comparison is with
the skill intensity of the whole manufacturing sector.10 The last two columns show
10I leave Agriculture and Mining out of the comparison for two reasons: first they are relatively
skill un-intensive, so in any case they would lower the traded sector average, and second tariffs in
agriculture increased and tariffs in Mining decreased only mildly. So the bulk of the reduction in
domestic market access is due to changes in manufacturing tariffs (see Table 3.4).
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that using both measures, the non-traded sector is more skilled-intensive than the
manufacturing sector.
Table 4.7 shows the change in each sector’s share of total hours and of total
wage bill in the economy between 1991 and 2000. The non-traded sector increased
its relative size both measured as its share of hours and its share of the wage bill
at the expense of the rest of sectors in the economy, Agriculture, Mining, and
Manufacturing. Although this increased importance of the non-traded sector could
be due to other factors, like changes in preferences or technology, it is consistent
with the mechanism I proposed: increased competition as a consequence of trade
liberalization led to an increase in the size of the non-traded sector, a reduction in
the size of manufacturing, and therefore, an increase in the skill premium.
Finally, one aspect of the empirical strategy to take into account is that it is
not meant to explain the country wide evolution of the skill premium but the rela-
tive evolution across regions. The country-wide skill premium decreased in Brazil,
which could be due to other factors. The model I estimate simply says that be-
sides the overall decreasing trend in the skill premium, regions that experienced a
higher decrease in domestic market access as a result of increased competition from
the rest of the World, experienced a smaller decrease in the skill premium than
they would have otherwise experienced. So that increased openness to international




In this Chapter, I extended the model in Chapter 2 to allow for different levels of
education across workers. I proposed an estimation strategy to explore the impact
of changes in market access on changes in the skill premium. I found that decreased
domestic market resulting from trade liberalization resulted in a higher skill premium
in Brazilian microregions and that this is explained by a higher elasticity of unskilled
wages to market access compared to skilled wages. I show empirical evidence that
supports the non-traded sector is relatively skilled-intensive compared to the rest of
the sectors in Brazil, which can explain my findings.
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4.6 Tables
Tab. 4.1: Changes in domestic market access and changes in the skill premium in
Brazilian microregions. OLS and 2SLS estimates. 1991-2000
Dependent variable: log skill premium change 1991-2000
I. OLS II. 2SLS ( IV: ELTC)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
d lnDMA91−00 0.0113 -0.0198 -0.0272 -0.134***
(0.0204) (0.0187) (0.0291) (0.0418)
R-squared 0.000 0.136 0.103
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient esti-
mates. Standard errors clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include an
intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Tab. 4.2: Changes in domestic market access and changes in wages in Brazilian mi-
croregions. OLS and 2SLS estimates. 1991-2000
I. OLS II. 2SLS (IV: ELTC)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent variable: log skilled wages change 1991-2000
d lnDMA91−00 0.0936*** 0.0691*** 0.144** 0.0749**
(0.0327) (0.0175) (0.0720) (0.0306)
R-squared 0.030 0.254 0.021 0.254
Panel B. Dependent variable: log unskilled wages change 1991-2000
d lnDMA91−00 0.0822*** 0.0889*** 0.171** 0.208***
(0.0276) (0.0120) (0.0789) (0.0549)
R-squared 0.044 0.342 0.274
State FE X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Standard errors clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include an intercept.
Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 4.3: Changes in domestic market access and changes in the skill premium in
Brazilian microregions. 2SLS estimates. 1991-2000
Dependent variable: log skill premium change 1991-2000
I. IV:ETC II. IV: EMC III. IV: LTC
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d lnDMA91−00 -0.0453 -0.143*** -0.130 -0.215 0.141 0.393
(0.0342) (0.0322) (0.0962) (0.142) (0.174) (0.573)
R-squared 0.097 0.038
State FE X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors
clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include an intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Tab. 4.4: Changes in domestic market access and changes in wages in Brazilian mi-
croregions. 2SLS estimates. 1991-2000
I. IV:ETC II. IV: EMC III. IV: LTC
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Dependent variable: log skilled wage change 1991-2000
d lnDMA91−00 0.0966 0.0570 0.123 0.142 -0.0554 0.256
(0.0677) (0.0428) (0.0807) (0.121) (0.310) (0.279)
R-squared 0.030 0.254 0.027 0.241 0.168
Panel B. Dependent variable: log unskilled wage change 1991-2000
d lnDMA91−00 0.142** 0.200*** 0.253*** 0.358*** -0.196 -0.137
(0.0552) (0.0282) (0.0833) (0.103) (0.382) (0.418)
R-squared 0.021 0.283 0.100
State FE X X X
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors
clustered by state. N=494. All specifications include an intercept. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
131
Tab. 4.5: Exposure and changes in the skill premium and wages in Brazilian microre-
gions. Reduced form estimates. 1991-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)









R-squared 0.456 0.481 0.313 0.270









R-squared 0.246 0.245 0.246 0.243









R-squared 0.358 0.360 0.344 0.305
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
N=494. All specifications include an intercept and state fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered by state. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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Tab. 4.6: Descriptive statistics of variables in regressions






1.0187 0.2037 0.3342 2.1346
wS in usd 1.9316 0.6893 0.5112 4.5144
wU in usd 0.6919 0.2447 0.2951 1.6226






0.9339 0.1857 0.4603 1.5723
wS in usd 2.5454 0.8180 1.0578 6.8336
wU in usd 0.9954 0.2995 0.3842 1.9687
DMA -12.6065 1.2998 -19.2831 -7.9309





-0.0848 0.1998 -0.9416 0.9064
wS in usd 0.2941 0.2028 -0.5435 1.2125
wU in usd 0.3789 0.1471 -0.1599 0.9287
d lnDFMA91−00 -1.4205 0.3735 -2.9435 -0.4070
Panel D: Exposure in 1991
ETC -0.0233 0.0300 -0.1172 0.0216
EMC 0.9667 0.1455 0.0353 1.3625
LTC -0.3422 0.0374 -0.4026 -0.1593
ELTC -0.0092 0.0087 -0.0773 0.0010
Notes: The number of observations is 494 for every variable. Wages are in current US
dollars.
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Tab. 4.7: Share of hours and share of wage bill by sector, 1991 and 2000
share of hours (%) share of wage bill (%)
1991 2000 1991 2000
Agriculture 23.84 18.27 8.90 6.99
Mining 1.07 0.50 1.12 0.49
Manufacturing 16.47 14.77 18.99 15.31




























No educ < 4th grade Grades 4-
8th





Notes: Workers aged 18-55 not enrolled in school. Years of education for each category: No education: 0; Less than
4th grade: 1-3; Grades 4-8th: 4-8; High School dropout: 0-10; High School grad: 11+; Some College: 12+; College
graduate: 15+. The share of individuals who started High School but did not finish it is 3% in 1991 and 5% in
2000.
Source: Brazilian Population Census 1991 and 2000 (IBGE).
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Notes: quintiles of the skill premium in 1991 (Panel A) and 2000 (Panel B). 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit
the 26 states and the federal district.

































Notes: quintiles of the unskilled wages in 1991 (Panel A) and 2000 (Panel B). 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit
the 26 states and the federal district.
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Notes: quintiles of the skilled wages in 1991 (Panel A) and 2000 (Panel B). 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit the
26 states and the federal district.
















Notes: quintiles of skill premium changes expressed in log points. 494 microregions. Bold lines delimit the 26 states
and the federal district.
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Notes: quintiles of skilled (Panel A) and unskilled (Panel B) wage changes between 1991 and 2000. 494 microregions.
Bold lines delimit the 26 states and the federal district.
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Notes: Source: Brazilian Population Census 1991 (IBGE).
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
In this dissertation I analyze how trade linkages across local labor market shape
the response of local wages to nationwide trade shocks. In doing so, I reinterpret
the reduced form approach within a standard model of trade. I derive a measure
of exposure from the model and I show this measure explains more of the variation
in counterfactual wage changes than measures based on employment composition.
I also propose an estimation approach with which I show that employment-based
measures of exposure used in the reduced form literature overstate the negative
impact of trade liberalization in Brazil.
However, my analysis has several limitations. First, I assumed away any mi-
gration between regions. Even though I showed changes in market access do not
have a significant effect on the flow of migrants to a region, it would be useful to
incorporate migration in the model and analyze how it can potentially alter the
results. This can be even more important in the fourth chapter where I consider
workers of different skills since it is widely known that mobility varies across skill
groups. Second, I assumed there are no input-output linkages across sectors. These
linkages have the potential to generate spillovers across regions through changes in
input prices. In addition, it is likely that a great part of trade within the country is
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trade in intermediates. Although data limitations prevent me from distinguishing
between intermediate and final goods trade, this is still an important issue that
should be addressed in future research. Third, a limitation of the standard trade
model I use, is that it assumes full employment. One of the biggest burdens for
workers after trade reform is unemployment. It would be interesting to incorporate
this friction in the model and use variation in regional unemployment rates to es-
timate the impact of tariff changes in unemployment. Finally, a limitation of my
empirical strategy is that I only consider changes in import competition without
analyzing the effect that the reduction of Brazil’s trading partners’ tariffs had on
wages. I leave the analysis of changes in foreign market access for future research.
In a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, understanding which
regions are most sensitive to negative trade shocks is crucial to designing the right




A.1 Derivation of the wage elasticity
Consider a region i ∈ Home, total differentiation of the equilibrium system (equa-















j 6=R (σs − 1)πsijπsRjwjLj
dτs























































































































where s is the sector in which tariffs change. Note that if region i does not
produce good s, then the first equation terms are equal to 0 and the wage effect
comes entirely from the set of equations for sectors k 6= s.
Multiplying by τs
dτs



























































I used that ∑j ξij = 1.
Rearranging terms containing w̃i yields
w̃i =





































A.2 Shock affecting the two sectors
When there are tariff shocks that affect the sectors 1 and 2 simultaneously, the























































Solving the 3 × 3 system in equation A.1, the partial-equilibrium wage












































Under assumption 1, g1i = g2i = α. Under assumptions 2 to 5, we can express











which corresponds to the estimating equation in Autor et al. (2013).
A.3 Parameter values for simulations
• Parameter values.
– L (reg1, reg2, RoW ) = [50, 50, 100]
– β1 = β2 = [1, 1, 1]
– σ1 = σ2 = 2; µ1 = µ2 = 0.5
– κ1ij =
1 2 R
1 1 d−212 2d−21R
2 d−212 1 2d−22R
R 2d−21R 2d−22R 1
; κ2ij = 1.1κ1ij
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• The parametrization of trade costs assumes a gravity coefficient of −2 and an
ad-valorem equivalent of the border effect between the Home country and the
Rest of the World of 2.
• Trade shock: 5% fall in trade costs in sector 1 from RoW to regions 1 and 2
(alternatively and both at the same time).
• Experiment: regions are ex ante symmetric, and region 2 becomes more distant
with respect to both region 1 and the RoW (d12and d1R increase sequentially).
• Due to symmetry in size and no comparative advantage, Exposure = 0.5 for
all values of trade costs
A.4 Omitted variable bias
This section explores the econometric consequences of the exposure approach and
treats it as an omitted variable problem.
The partial-equilibrium wage change derived from the model is given by:
ŵPEi = α0 + w̃PEi τ̂ k + εi (A.4)
where τ̂ kis the tariff change of good k and w̃PEi is the partial-equilibrium
elasticity as defined in equation 2.21.
We can formalize the exposure approach as parametrizing this elasticity in the
following way: w̃PEi = α1
Lki
Li
where βα1 is unobserved by the econometrician. This
allows to rewrite equation A.4 as:
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ŵi = β0 + α1
Lki
Li
τ̂ k + ζi (A.5)






τ̂ k. Even under no correlation







employment shares will be correlated with ζi unless the partial elasticity is a linear
function of employment shares ρki = α1
Lki
Li
. The formulation of the partial elasticity
in equation , shows this is not the case.
A.5 Solution algorithm
The algorithm that solves for counterfactual wages and sectoral employment is based
on Alvarez and Lucas (2007) but extended to solve for employment shares. Given
the values for Li, βki , κkij, µk, and σk, this algorithm solves for N wages and N ×K
sectoral employment values using the following steps








and ∑k λki = 1.
















3. Compare λki,1 and λki,0, if the difference is greater than an arbitrary υL ∼ 0,
update the guess using the formula
λki,2 = sλki,0 + (1− s)λki,1
where s ∈ (0, 1) is a smoothing parameter. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until∣∣∣λki,t − λki,t−1∣∣∣ < υL.
4. Use updated employment shares, λki,t , and the initial guess for wages, wi,0, to

















6. If |TBi,0| > υw, update wages using
wi,1 = wi,0 (1 + φTBi,0)
where φ > 0 is an adjustment factor. As in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), I exploit
that the equation for the trade balance is a contraction in wages. If TBi > 0
(TBi < 0), then there is an excess demand (supply) for region i’s products
and therefore, region i’s wages must increase (decrease) to re-establish trade
balance. Repeat steps 2-4 using wi,1 and λki,t as an initial guess.
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A.6 Price index changes












where p0i is the price of the non traded good and P ki is the ideal price index of
each traded sector given by equation 2.2. Equation A.6 follows from the fact that
the upper tier utility function has a Cobb-Douglas functional form.
The level of the sectoral price indices, P ki , cannot be pinned down since its
calculation requires the knowledge of the number of varieties in each sector nki and
therefore, of the fixed cost, F k, in equation 2.6. To avoid the calibration of these
parameters and since the level of the price index is irrelevant–only its change matters


































where I use that the change in the non-traded good price is equal, by equation









)1−σk = υk∑j Lkj,t (wj,tκkij/βkj )1−σk




)1−σk , which follows from equations 2.7 and 2.8. Note that
wages and sectoral employment in equation A.7 are directly obtained from the data
in t. Their values in t+ 1 correspond to counterfactuals obtained solving the model
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for the new tariffs. The parameters, κkji, βkj , σk, µk are calibrated in t (1991) and
are assumed to remain constant after the trade shock.
A.7 Assumptions on residual sectors and implications for
relative wages
A.7.1 Constant returns to scale non-traded sector. Bal-
anced trade.
Suppose the non-traded good is produced in region i with a constant returns to scale








with η < 1 and where SNi and UNi are, respectively, the amounts of skilled and
unskilled labor used in production, measured in hours.
Perfect competition in this sector implies producers take the price of their
good and wages as given. Therefore, first order conditions are given by















where wSi and wUi are, respectively, the hourly wage paid to skilled and un-
skilled labor.




wSi Si + wUi Ui
]




wSi Si + wUi Ui
]
is the share of the non-traded good in total regional
expenditure. I used that by perfect competition in the non-traded good sector, price
equals unit costs and therefore: pNi = ηwSi + (1− η)wUi .










η (wSi /wUi ) + (1− η)
(A.12)
This equation shows that the given the values of parameters, µ0 and η, endow-
ments, {Si, Ui}, and relative wages, wSi /wUi , the output of the non traded sector is
fixed. Therefore, an increase in the level of wages that keeps relative wages constant,
does not affect output in the non-traded sector.
A.7.2 Constant returns to scale non-traded sector. Unbal-
anced trade.
Suppose that each region has an exogenous trade deficit given by Di. Regional
aggregate expenditure is now given by wSi Si + wUi Ui + Di so the non-traded sector





wSi Si + wUi Ui +Di
]
ηwSi + (1− η)wUi
. (A.13)








Si + Ui +Di/wUi
]
η (wSi /wUi ) + (1− η)
(A.14)
Therefore, a constant relative wage no longer implies a constant size of the
non-traded sector. Suppose both skilled and unskilled wages increase in the same
proportion, the size of the non-traded sector decreases since income does not increase
in the same proportion as costs.
A.7.3 Freely traded residual sector
Consider a freely traded good that is produced in every region i with a constant
returns to scale technology which uses both skilled and unskilled labor. Perfect
competition in this sector yields a zero profit condition that states that the price of
this good equals its unit cost of production:
1 = (wSi )η(wUi )1−η (A.15)
where the price of the freely traded good is normalized to one, without loss of
generality.
Total differentiation of equation (A.15) yields
152
0 = ηŵSi + (1− η)ŵUi (A.16)
Solving for changes in unskilled wages, this equation implies skilled and un-
skilled wages have to change in opposite directions: ŵUi = − η1−η ŵ
S
i . Substituting









If the traded sectors are skilled intensive relative to the freely traded sector,
then αj1−αj >
η
1−η and the term in square brackets is positive. Therefore, an increase
in equilibrium market access leads to an increase in skilled wages and a decrease in
unskilled wages.
Note that this is a partial equilibrium result since by definition, equilibrium
market access of region i depends on every other region’s wages though equilibrium
expenditures and price indices which are themselves functions of wages in every
location. Any exogenous shock to region’s i market access has a direct impact on
region’s i wages through equation (A.17). In turn, the change in region i’s wages




B.1 Data sources and definitions
B.1.1 Wages and employment
Wages and employment data are from the Brazilian Demographic Censuses of 1991
and 2000 conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
The censuses are carried out in July of the corresponding year. As in Kovak (2013),
I restrict the sample to workers aged 18–55 who were not enrolled in school at the
time they were surveyed.
Based on the reported municipality, I assign workers to microregions. Mi-
croregions are defined in a geographically consistent way across the 1991 and 2000
Demographic Censuses using a mapping provided in Kovak (2013).
I obtain the worker’s hourly wage by dividing the monthly income in their main
job by the weekly hours worked in their main job times 4.33, which corresponds to
the average number of weeks in a month. The yearly income of a worker is simply
the reported monthly income in the main job times 12. I weight both the hourly
wage and the income by the individual’s sampling weight, which is provided in the
census data. I then obtain individual annual hours worked by dividing the annual
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income by the hourly wage. I convert the hourly wage to current US dollars using
exchange rates from the World Development Indicators dataset.
Finally, I aggregate the data at the region-sector level. I obtain hours worked
in a region-sector (Lki ) as the sum of yearly hours of workers in that region-sector
and the regional wage (wi) as the simple average of hourly wages across all workers
in a region.
B.1.2 Tariffs
Brazilian tariff data are from Kume et al. (2000). The authors start from data at
the tariff-line level for the period 1988-1998 and aggregate it using simple averages
up to SCN (Sistema de Contas Nacionais), the Brazilian National Accounts sector
classification, at the 4-digit level (also called “Nivel 80” or Level 80). Then, they
aggregate the data to the 2-digit level (also called SCN 43) using industry value-
added weights. I aggregate their data from SCN 43 to my own 12-sector industry
classification using value added weights from the Input Output matrix in the year
1991, obtained from IBGE.1
B.1.3 Elasticities of substitution
The elasticities of substitution between varieties in each sector are from Broda and
Weinstein (2006).2 I use import demand elasticities for Brazil, at the HS 3-digit




IBGE.3 At the HS 3-digit level, there are many-to-many mappings between both
classifications, so I keep the match with the highest imports. To aggregate from
SCN to my classification of 12 sectors, I use the median elasticity.
B.1.4 Interstate and international trade
Trade flows between Brazilian states at the sector level are from Vasconcelos and
Oliveira (2006). This data corresponds to the year 1999 and is reported using the
2-digit CNAE classification (59 codes).
The original data corresponds to exports by Brazilian states to other states.
Of a total of 26 states plus the Federal District, only 22 had data that, according to
the authors, was of enough quality to be used. In addition, one state did not report
its exports by destination state.4 This leaves me with interstate export data for 21
states. Since these states report exports to the 6 missing states, interstate import
flows can be recovered for all 27 states. Therefore, the number of observations for
each industry is 546 = 21×(27−1). The 6 missing states have an estimated importer
fixed effect in the gravity estimation but not an estimated exporter fixed effect.
Trade flows between Brazil and the ROW are obtained from the AliceWeb
System (supported by the Secretary of International Trade, SECEX). This dataset
reports the f.o.b. value of exports and imports in current US dollars at the 10-
digit Brazilian Nomenclature (NBM, Nomenclatura Brasileira de Mercadorias) sec-
tor classification in 1991 and at the 8-digit Mercosur’s Common Nomenclature in
3available at http://concla.ibge.gov.br/classificacoes/correspondencias/atividades-economicas.
4The states of Acre, Amapá, Maranhão, Rio Grande do Norte, and Roraima, did not have data
of enough quality and Ceará only reported aggregate exports.
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2000 (NCM96, Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul). I use converters from both
classifications to the CNAE clasiffication from IBGE.
B.1.5 Distances
I calculate distances between the microregions’ centroids using the Haversine for-
mula. For the gravity estimation, which is done at the state level, I calculate Haver-
sine distances between the states’ centroids.5
I calculate distances between the microregions and the ROW using the Haver-
sine formula between a microregion’s centroid and its nearest sea port. For the
gravity estimation, I calculate distances between the states and the ROW as the
simple average distance of the microregions in that state to the nearest sea port.
I define the distance of a microregion or of a state to itself as the aver-
age distance in a circular region of the same area, using the formula distii =
0.66(area/π)1/2. The data on the areas of the microregions and the states is from
the Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA).6
B.1.6 Rest of the world wages and employment
I obtain the ROW hourly wages using data on hours worked and GDP from Penn
World Tables version 8.1 with the following procedure. I calculate the ratio of
hours worked in Brazil to hours worked in the ROW, which is .115 in 1991 (and
0.117 in 2000). I calculate total hours worked in the ROW as: hoursROW =




.115 − hoursBRA, where hoursBRA are total hours worked in Brazil according
to the population Census data and hoursROW are total hours worked in the Rest of
the World excluding Brazil . Then, I obtain the ratio of the GDP of Brazil to the
ROW from PWT, which is 0.021 in 1991 (and 0.027 in 2000), and I calculate the
wagebill of the ROW as wagebillROW = wagebillBRA.021 −wagebillBRA where wagebillBRA
is the Brazilian wagebill obtained from the population Census. Finally, I obtain the
hourly wage of the ROW as: wageROW = wagebillROWhoursROW .
I obtain the ROW sectoral employment using data on sector’s value added
from UNIDO Industrial Statistics and UN Statistics Division National Accounts
Main Aggregates Database. First, I calculate ROW total value added in current
US dollars for 1991 and 2000 from UN National Accounts data for 213 countries,
excluding Brazil. I obtain Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Mining shares in VA
from UN National Accounts. The data is in national currencies, so I obtain the
ROW aggregate shares weighting countries shares by their share in World VA in US
dollars. Agricultural and Mining shares correspond directly to sectors 1 and 2 of my
classification, Manufacturing corresponds to the rest of the sectors. To obtain the
share of the rest of the manufacturing sectors, I use data from UNIDO. To minimize
missing data I use the version INDSTAT3 for 1991 and the version INDSTAT4
for 2000. I restrict the sample to the 50 countries that appear in both versions
of the data, excluding Brazil. INDSTAT3 uses the ISIC Rev2 classification and
INDSTAT4 uses the ISIC Rev3 classification. I convert both industry classifications
to my own classification using a converter from ISIC Rev3 to CNAE from IBGE.7
7For INDSTAT3 I first convert to ISIC Rev 3, and then to CNAE.
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Then, I calculate the share of each manufacturing sector in manufacturing value
added. Finally, I obtain VA in US dollars for each sector by multiplying these
shares by the share of manufacturing in total VA and by the ROW total VA in US
dollars.
B.1.7 Industry crosswalks
The data at the sector level used in this paper is originally reported using different
industry classifications. The 1991 Census report individuals’ industry of employment
using the atividade classification, which is specific to Brazil; the 2000 Census uses the
CNAE domiciliar, a specific branch of Brasil’s National Classification of Economic
Activities (CNAE, Classificação Nacional das Atividades); Brazilian imports and
exports at the product level are reported using Mercosur’s Common Nomenclature
1996 (NCM96, Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul); interstate trade is reported
using the 2-digit National Classification of Economic Activities prevailing in Brazil
(CNAE); elasticities of substitution are reported using the Harmonized System at
the 3-digit level; tariffs are reported using the National Accounts System at the two
digit level (SCN43, Sistema de Contas Nacionais), and the value added of the Rest
of the World is reported using ISICRev2 at the 3-digit level for 1991 and ISICRev3
at the 4-digit level for 2000.
The variables that restrict the possible mappings the most are tariffs (2-digit
SCN43) and interstate trade (2 digit-CNAE). The SCN classification is convertible
to the CNAE classification. The mapping is one to many going from 2-digit SCN
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to 4-digit CNAE. However, going to 2-digit CNAE the mapping becomes many-to-
many. To deal with this issue, I create a coarser industry classification described in
table B.4. This is the classification that implied the minimum number of arbitrary
mappings.8
In order to make compatible the rest of the variables, I assign them to either
the 2-digit CNAE or to the 2-digit SCN. I convert hours and wages, and international
trade to the 2-digit CNAE classification while I convert elasticities of substitution
and the Rest of the World’s value added to the 2-digit SCN.
8In fact, the only arbitrary mapping I made was to assign sector 14 in CNAE (Non-metallic
minerals extraction) to sector 2 in the SCN classification (Mineral Extraction, except fuel) when
it was also assigned to sector 31 in SCN (Other food and beverage industries).
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B.2 Supplementary tables
Tab. B.1: Elasticities of substitution and Cobb-Douglas shares
Sector σk µk,BRA µk,ROW
Agric. 3.30 0.310 0.137
Mining 3.60 0.054 0.069
Mineral Manuf. 2.69 0.030 0.030
Metal, Mach., Elect. & Autom 3.12 0.241 0.368
Paper 2.53 0.039 0.081
Rubber & Plastic 3.31 0.024 0.033
Chemic., Pharm. & Petrol. 2.65 0.086 0.100
Textiles 3.13 0.032 0.026
Apparel 3.24 0.060 0.016
Footwear & Leather 14.64 0.010 0.005
Food 3.56 0.048 0.101
Wood & Others 3.01 0.065 0.035
Notes: Parameters and targets by sector used in the calibra-
tion in 1991. σk is the elasticity of substitution across varieties,
µk,BRA and µk,ROW are the calibrated Cobb-Douglas shares for
Brazil and the ROW respectively.
Sources: σk: Broda et al. (2006), µk,BRA and µk,ROW : own
calculation based on IBGE, SECEX, PWT, and UNIDO. See
Data Appendix for details.
161
Tab. B.2: Imports and exports to value added ratio, 1991 and 2000.
1991 2000
Sector M/V A X/V A M/V A X/V A
Agric. 0.018 0.008 0.055 0.154
Mining 0.705 0.294 1.289 0.966
Mineral Manuf. 0.034 0.041 0.161 0.340
Metal, Mach., Elect. & Autom 0.361 0.353 1.773 1.472
Paper 0.101 0.190 0.196 0.415
Rubber & Plastic 0.163 0.114 0.907 0.678
Chemic., Pharm. & Petrol. 0.510 0.160 1.800 0.641
Textiles 0.127 0.186 0.280 0.250
Apparel 0.011 0.015 0.022 0.041
Footwear & Leather 0.171 0.722 0.196 0.765
Food 0.164 0.545 0.269 1.028
Wood & Others 0.151 0.098 0.050 0.201
Notes: M/V A (X/V A) are Brazilian sectoral imports (exports) divided by
sectoral value added in the respective year.
Source: Tradeflows: SECEX. Value added: Population census, IBGE. See
Section 3.2 and Data Appendix for details.
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Mineral Manuf. 451.0 111.0
Metal, Mach., Elect. & Autom 9.0 1.0
Paper 231.0 91.0
Rubber & Plastic 26.0 8.0
Chemic., Pharm. & Petrol. 56.0 16.0
Textiles 16.0 10.0
Apparel 46.0 29.0
Footwear & Leather 1.3 1.2
Food 16.0 1.0
Wood & Others 23.0 22.0
Notes: Calibrated border effect factors, χk, at the
microregion level in 1991 and 2000. See section 3.3
for details.
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Tab. B.4: Correspondence between industrial classifications.
Sector Description SCN CNAE
1 Agriculture 1 1, 2, 5
2 Mineral Mining 2, 3 10, 11, 13, 14
4 Non-Metallic Mineral Manufacturing 4 26




15 Paper Manufacturing, Publishing, and
Printing
15 21,22
16 Rubber and Plastic Products
Manufacturing
16, 21 25
17 Chemical and Pharmaceutical
Manufacturing and Petroleum Refining
17-20 23, 24
22 Textiles Manufacturing 22 17
23 Apparel Manufacturing 23 18
24 Footwear and Leather Products
Manufacturing
24 19
25 Food Processing 25-31 15, 16
32 Wood Products, Furniture, and Other
Products Manufacturing
14, 32 20, 36, 37
99 Non-Traded Goods and Services 33, 43 40-73
Notes: Mapping between 2-digit national accounts (SCN) classification and
2-digit National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE) and my own
classification (first and second columns).
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Tab. B.5: Data Sources and Classifications.
Variable Data Source Classification
Elasticities of substitution Broda et al. (2006) HS-3 digit
Hours and wages Demographic Census 1991 and 2000 Atividade and CNAE Dom
International trade Aliceweb (SECEX) NCM96
Interstate trade Vasconcelos and Oliveira (2006) 2-digit CNAE
Tariffs Kume et al. (2000) 2-digit SCN43
Value added (ROW) UNIDO INDSTAT3 and INDSTAT4 ISIC Rev2 and ISIC Rev3
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